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Today, information security breaches are steadily increasing, constantly puzzling security 
managers on how to make the best investment decisions to fight against cyberattacks. The 
problem is that there is a lack of understanding about the dynamic interaction between attackers 
and defender when making security investment decisions.  The goal of this thesis is to develop 
a system dynamics model that describes the dynamic interaction between a defender, who 
initially invests a portion of the security budget and defers the remaining investments until 
security breaches occurs, known as wait and see strategy; and an attacker, who repeatedly 
targets and exploits the weakest link of the defense, known as weakest link strategy. The 
research employed qualitative and quantitative system dynamic modeling tools based on 
theoretical frameworks from the information security investment literature. A simulation 
model was built to understand the behavior of both adversaries when applying the 
aforementioned strategies under uncertainty and propose policy options to solve the 
problematic behavior. Scenario and policy analyses were conducted to test the hypothesis that 
under uncertainty the wait and see and the weakest link approaches, are not effective security 
investment strategies. Scenarios show that when uncertainty increases, it is rational for the 
defender to under-invest in information security and rather cope with attacks. In situations of 
high uncertainty, effective security investment requires acquiring knowledge about attacks and 
shifting from reactive to proactive investment strategies. Two policy options were proposed to 
improve defenders’ financial performance over time, 1) information sharing among defenders 
and 2) higher dismissal time of attacks. By implementing information sharing policy, defenders 
experience a worst-before-better behavior, meaning that defenders need to be patient to 
perceive the benefits of this policy. Furthermore, implementing higher dismissal time of attacks 
entails more immediate benefits, though with managerial implications such as the need of a 
higher security budget. Finally, implementation of the combination of information sharing and 
higher dismissal time depends on the size of the firm’s and the available budget (capabilities) 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Background Information 
 
The internet revolution has dramatically transformed the way people, firms, and governments 
communicate and conduct business. However, this extensive interconnectivity has increased 
the vulnerability of computer systems to information security breaches (Gordon et al., 2003). 
Protection of their IT systems, data, intellectual property, and business processes against 
attacks,  misuse or technical failures has become and is predicted to remain a key challenge for 
organizations (Anderson, 2001; Gartner, 2011, 2012; Suby & Dickson, 2015; Whitman, 2003).  
IT threats can lead, for example, to the disruption of production and service processes (e.g., 
attack on MasterCard and Visa (The Guardian, 2010) and data theft (e.g., attack on Sony 
Pictures Entertainment (The Washington Post, 2014) and the disruption of more than a billion 
accounts at Yahoo (The Guardian, 2016)), which in turn result in economic damage, including 
losses in productivity and revenue, strategic disadvantages and loss of reputation 
(Bandyopadhyay et al., 2009). A more recent example of a world-spread cyberattack is the 
Wannacry ransomware attack in May 2017, which exploited Microsoft’s Operating System 
default vulnerabilities and affected several types of companies, public institutions, universities 
and personal computers all over the world; demanding ransom payments via Bitcoins 
cryptocurrency to unblock the access to their data (The Guardian, 2017; The Telegraph, 2017). 
Some countries have not been affected by the Wannacry attack, yet, this does not give any 
indication whether these countries will not be attacked in the future (Avast, 2017). Many 
security incidents are attributable to cybercrime, which can be considered a growing industry 
(McAfee, 2014).  
Information security is more than just a defensive mechanism by organizations. Information 
security is also a strategic variable that can help organizations gain a competitive advantage in 
the market (Huang et al., 2008). The importance of information security has led many 
organization to pay much attention to information security investment decisions and, 
particularly to deriving the appropriate level of these investments (e.g., Bodin et al., 2005; 
Cavusoglu et al., 2004, 2005; Gordon & Loeb, 2002; Huang et al., 2008). However, even with 
all the emphasis on security, the amount of unauthorized intrusions and security breaches are 










Organizations have responded to emerging IT security threats with high investments in IT 
security. As stated in Gartner (2016), the worldwide spending on IT security reached $81.6 
billion in 2016, an increase of 7.9 percent over 2015, and is expected to grow further around 8 
percent in following years. These figures indicate that the IT security landscape is occupied not 
only by technological challenges but also by financial ones, that companies face while 
implementing measures to prevent losses and respond to damage recovery efforts resulting 
from cybercrimes (Gordon & Richardson, 2004). In this context, it is of crucial importance to 
know how companies can effectively defend themselves against cyber-attacks. 
Today, information security breaches are still common and rising as illustrated in Figure 1, 
constantly puzzling security managers regarding investment decisions to fight against attacks 
(Arora et al., 2004). Determining the right amount to spend on information security activities 
is linked to efficiently allocating such resources to specific security strategies. Each security 
strategy involves different cost, effectiveness and potential benefits; many of these are difficult 
to quantify (Nazareth & Choi, 2015). This struggle rises because of the uncertainty surrounding 
threat manifestation, damage suffered, recovery efforts and loss of reputation (Bandyopadhyay 
et al., 2009; Sun, 2013). Nonetheless, managers need to select security strategies in a periodic 
basis. Then, key economic questions for organizations arise from these facts: which of their 
assets (processes, systems, etc.) need which level of protection, which security 
countermeasures (e.g., firewalls, intrusion detection systems, security training, or security 
policies) lead to this protection and how much should be spent on which countermeasure? 
(Anderson & Schneier, 2005; Gordon & Loeb, 2002, 2006). 
 




In the efforts to secure data and systems, research conducted by practitioners and scholars has 
primarily been focused on the technical aspects of information security, that is, on the questions 
of which assets need which level of protection and which security countermeasures lead to this 
protection. Research related to the economics of information security, that is, to the question 
of how much should be spent on security countermeasures, is still nascent (Gordon & Loeb, 
2006; Huang et al., 2008). This is reasonable, because information security investments usually 
do not generate direct monetary benefits such as higher revenues or lower costs; their main 
contribution is to prevent potential economic losses from happening (Böhme & Nowey, 2008). 
However, given the high cost of information security measures and budget constraints, a ‘‘fully 
secure organization’’ is a challenging, if not impossible goal (Bodin et al., 2005; Huang et al., 
2007).  
1.2 Problem Formulation 
One explanation for the struggle managers face when making cyber security investments could 
be that most managers do not fully understand the economics of investing in security as pointed 
out by Anderson (2001) and Gordon and Richardson (2004). Even though the vast majority of 
security managers are willing to use economic and financial concepts in making security 
investment decisions (Gordon et al., 2003), many information security issues relate to 
qualitative and nonfinancial concerns (Bohme & Moore, 2009) such as behavioral aspects. 
There are only few systemic approaches capturing the complexity of behavioral aspects in 
information security mentioned by Martinez-Moyano et al., (2011). As Martinez-Moyano et 
al., indicate, “behavioral considerations of the problem are at least as important in contributing 
to solutions to information security” (2011, p. 398). Such behavioral aspects may include 
attacker-defender interactions influencing investment decision-making in information security.  
Hence, “traditional economic approaches are severely constrained by their assumptions of 
relationships being sequential (as in the case of game theory), deterministic (as in financial 
analysis), or static (as in economic analysis), and often overly simplified (small number of 
variables)” (Behara et al., 2007, p.1573). Traditional economic approaches do not seem to be 
sufficiently comprehensive for understanding attacker-defender interactions and for drawing 
conclusions regarding effective security investment. 
Since managers struggle to make appropriate investment strategies, a model that captures the 
complexities of security investment decisions while allowing to explore alternative strategies, 
would be an invaluable aid to them.  
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The interactions between attackers and defenders need to consider elements such as the 
underlying structure that generates long-term investment behavior, nonlinearities, feedback 
mechanisms, delays, learning, etc.; which are vital for improving understanding on adversarial 
decision processes and behavior (Martinez-Moyano et al., 2015). These factors form the basic 
building blocks for the methodology of System Dynamics that uses computer simulation 
modeling for policy analysis and design in complex dynamic systems (Sterman, 2000).   
This thesis develops a System Dynamics model that integrates existing theoretical frameworks 
on information security investments. The model describes the dynamic interactions between:  
 A defender, who faces uncertainty about the attackers’ attack strategies, initially 
investing a portion of the budget and defer the remaining investments until security 
breaches occur (see Wait-and-see-approach in Gordon et al., (2003))1, and  
 An attacker who repeatedly targets the weakest link and exploits this advantage, as 
demonstrated in the economic model developed by Bohme & Moore (2009)2.  
This leads to defenders adapting their strategies over time based on the reported successful 
attacks. By using computer simulation, the iterative process of attack and defense in three 
security vectors3 (A, B and C) is captured, exploring the balance between proactive and reactive 
security investment and later analyzing the model through scenario and policy options 
simulations under uncertainty. Thus, this study presents a hypothesis stating that with the 
representation of Wait-and-see and Weakest Link Approaches in an integrated dynamic 
framework, there might be unintended consequences for attackers and defenders over time. 
When making investment decisions under different uncertainty levels, WAS and WL will not 
be effective approaches anymore. In this context, the need of a dynamic framework to test this 
hypothesis, is what motivates this thesis.  
 
                                                          
1 The defender behavior is characterized by the Wait-And-See approach, which can be explained by Gordon et al. 
(2003) as “before investing in information security, it may be advisable to wait for a security break to happen. As 
soon as the breach occurs, more information to assess the expected benefits of an information security investment 
is available, which makes the assessment more accurate” (p. 10).  
2 The attacker behavior is described by the Weakest Link approach, which consists of an ongoing process of 
locating the least secure element of a system. Ultimately, hackers seek out vulnerabilities and break the weakest 
link to gain access and entry into a secured environment (Stewart, 2014).  
3 As defined by Howard & LeBlanc (2002), security vectors are externally visible and accessible system resources 
that can be used to mount an attack on the system and subsequently weighted according to the potential damage 
that could be caused by any given exploitation of a vulnerability.  
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1.3 Research Objective 
 
The aim of this thesis is to first, understand the dynamic interactions between defenders and 
attackers when making information security investment decisions, and second, derive the main 
implications of two theoretical frameworks from information security investment literature: 
The Wait-And-See approach for defenders and the Weakest Link approach for attackers. For 
this purpose, a System Dynamics model is proposed to study investment strategies derived 
from such theoretical frameworks. 
 
1.4 Research Questions 
 
1.4.1 What are the relevant concepts and variables and relationships described in Wait-
And-See and Weakest Link theoretical frameworks? 
 
1.4.2 How can existing theoretical frameworks defined in WAS and WL be represented   
in a System Dynamics framework? 
1.4.2.1 How can the identified concepts and variables in the literature be represented in a 
stock and flow diagram? 
1.4.2.2 Which feedback loops link these concepts and relationships? 
 
1.4.3 What are the dynamic implications of WAS and WL theories in the SD model? 
1.4.3.1 How does financial performance for the defender and successful attacks develop 
over time? 
 
1.4.4 What are the dynamic implications for investment decisions in information 
security under different uncertainty level scenarios? 
1.4.4.1 To what extent does the level of uncertainty of attacks affect investment decisions 
when capabilities of defenders and attackers are asymmetrical? 
1.4.4.2 To what extent does the level of uncertainty of attacks affect investment decisions 
when security vector values are asymmetrical? 
1.4.4.3 Why and under which conditions is it rational for the defenders to under-invest in 
information security? 
 
1.4.5 What policy options can be identified and what are their dynamic implications? 
1.4.5.1 When is it better to defer investments, and respond to attacks in a reactive way? 




Chapter 2: Methodology 
 
2.1 Research Strategy and Methodology Choice  
 
This thesis adopts a mixed-methods research strategy. A mixed-methods research strategy 
combines qualitative and quantitative approaches (Denscombe, 2012). Given that information 
security is a complex system of many closely interrelated variables as pointed out by Behara 
et al. (2007), a mixed-methods research strategy is suitable to achieve the objective of this 
thesis: namely, to understand and derive the dynamic implications between defenders and 
attackers described by the WAS and WL approaches, respectively. Thus, a dynamic framework 
within which these approaches can operate with each other over time as they do in the real 
world, was needed. System dynamics (SD) is a structural theory of dynamic systems (Lane, 
1999); it is based on the main hypothesis that the structure of social systems drives system 
behavior over time and is generally characterized by feedback loops, accumulation processes, 
and delays between cause and effect.  
System Dynamics uses a combination of first-order linear and non-linear difference equations 
to relate qualitative and quantitative factors within and across time periods and is based on the 
principles developed by Forrester to study managerial and dynamic decisions using control 
principles (Forrester, 1961; Homer & Oliva, 2001; Sterman, 2000). In SD, the models are 
theories about real systems that “must not only reproduce/predict behavior, but also explain 
how behavior is generated” (Barlas, 1996, p.185-186). Hence, the method employed in this 
thesis is a qualitative and quantitative System Dynamics modeling and simulation based 
analysis.   
Following the System Dynamics modelling process proposed in the SD literature (Luna-Reyes 
& Andersen, 2003; Richardson & Pugh, 1981) the qualitative stages to apply in this research 
are conceptualization and formulation of the model. These stages are helpful to gain insights 
regarding the complex dynamics between attackers and defenders described in the theoretical 
frameworks. In the qualitative phase, a systematic literature review was conducted (e.g., De 
Gooyert, 2016) of information security economics theoretical contributions. Then, the data was 
collected through a systematic literature review and qualitative SD tools were used to visually 
represent the concepts found in the literature. The tools to conceptualize the model and to guide 
the model formulation were stock and flow and causal loop diagrams. 
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Therefore, the stock and flow as well as causal loop diagrams resulting from the qualitative 
study, were continued in a quantitative model following modelling phases of model validation 
and behavior analysis, which provided a “simulations laboratory” enforcing the internal 
consistency of the theories, thus ensuring that behavior can be generated by its underlying 
assumptions (Repenning, 2002).  
2.2 Data Collection and Analysis 
 
The literature search and selection followed the guidelines of Webster and Watson (2002) who 
focused on the structure of the literature review and implemented by drawing the steps 
suggested by Okoli and Schabram (2010) who focused on the process of conducting a 
systematic literature review. With this in mind, the literature review presented in Chapter 3 of 
this thesis aims to cover the most relevant existing economic analysis studies of information 
security investments.  
To identify academic papers on the economic analysis of information security investment, a 
search was conducted for papers in the following databases: ACM Digital Library, Web of 
Knowledge, EBSCO, Google Scholar, IEEE Xplore Digital Library, Science Direct and the 
AIS Electronic Library.  The search for scientific articles was carried out between February 
and June 2017 using the search terms “information security investments”, “economics of 
information security”, “wait-and-see”, “weakest link” and “security decisions”. There was no 
limit for the period of time in this search. In addition, the following search keys were 
conducted: 
 (invest* OR economic OR cost) AND (information OR “information security” OR 
“information systems”) AND (“security process” OR (secure*AND (decision OR 
“vulnerabilit” OR “vector” OR attacks*OR capabilit* OR performance OR reputation 
OR “damage”))) 
 (financ* OR invest* OR cost OR economic) AND “security breach” AND effect,   
This search process resulted in a collection of 98 papers. During the collection of the academic 
papers, a practical screen was applied to determine which papers should be kept for further 
study (Okoli & Schabram, 2010). Applying the screen was alternated with the literature search 
in order to limit the amount of work involved in “going backward and forward.” A rather 
tolerant screening was used, since the goal was to obtain a broad overview of the papers 
published in this domain.  
14 
 
The sample for the scientific articles selected to conduct the qualitative phase of this study was 
obtained through a qualitative sampling technique, which is better understood as an ongoing 
iterative process co-occurring with data collection and data analysis (Drisko, 2003; LeCompte 
& Preissle, 1993). This means that the sample of scientific papers was initially 98 papers as it 
was the result of the database literature search and then was adapted throughout the process of 
the literature review. During the screening process, a more elaborate understanding was 
developed, which resulted in increasingly refined rounds of screening while going through the 
literature. After the screening process, 45 academic papers remained. The selected articles 
included economic models for making decisions on IS security investments. Articles with 
abstracts that did not focus on economics of information security were removed. For example, 
purely technical articles or which cover only management issues without considering 
investments in IT security were removed. After this process step, a conceptual stock and flow 
diagram was built to understand the causes and effects of the main variables of the problem 
and later, a causal loop diagram (CLD) was constructed to identify the main feedback loops. 
The SFD and CLD were based on the previous literature review and captured the interactions 
and relationships between the most important identified variables.  
Based on the stock and flow as well as causal loop diagrams that resulted from the previous 
stage, a quantitative stock and flow model was proposed. The analysis of such model was based 
on simulations from internally generated data that consequently allows for model validation 
and behavior analysis under specific scenarios. Simulations aid to discover implications of the 
theories assumptions that are not intuitively obvious by conducting various tests for model 
validation, performing sensitivity analysis and scenario analysis in a non-dangerous, non-
threatening, non-costly way (Axelrod, 2003; Größler et al., 2008). Thus, the intended tests to 
be performed in the validation phase are structure tests, structure-oriented tests and behavior 
tests (see Barlas, 1996). For the behavior analysis stage, the base line scenario will be set based 
on parameters that generate an equilibrium state between attackers and defenders’ strategies, 
i.e. WL and WAS. The scenario analysis phase, consisted on scenario runs that reflected 
different levels of uncertainty as well as different conditions for attackers and defender. Finally, 
the model was used to help to identify and explore policy options to improve the problematic 
behavior. The purpose of this analysis is an understanding of what policies work and why 
(Richardson & Pugh, 1981; Sterman, 2000). Policy alternatives were tested through parameter 




Chapter 3: Literature Review 
 
This chapter provides an overview of the literature relevant to this research project to answer 
the first research question. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the foundations of the 
qualitative and quantitative data for the system dynamics model constructed for this study, was 
obtained from the systematic analysis of the literature concerning information security 
investments. It is important to note that the knowledge gained from the literature review served 
both as sources of concepts (to form an understanding of the issue) and as sources of 
estimations and structural knowledge. 
3.1 Information Security Investments  
 
To better understand the existing economic analyses of information security investment, the 
literature was divided into two categories according to their research approaches as classified 
by Cavusoglu et al. (2008): (1) decision-theoretic approach, and (2) game-theoretic approach. 
The decision-theoretic approach uses the traditional risk or decision analysis framework to 
determine information security investment level, taking hackers’ efforts as exogenous. By 
contrast, the game-theoretic approach treats information security investment as a game between 
two players, e.g., between organizations and attackers, in which both the organization’s level 
of security investment level and the hackers’ efforts are endogenously determined. Studies in 
both approaches offer an understanding of how to determine an optimal level of investment in 
information security and the effectiveness of these investments. Studies in these two areas are 
described next. 
3.1.1 Optimal IS security investment  
 
Studies that investigated the optimal level of information security investment utilized the 
decision-theoretical and game-theoretical approaches and applied neoclassical economics 
assumptions.  
In previous work, functions of benefit/utility/profit are usually used to describe rational 
preference. For example, Gordon and Loeb (2002) built a function of expected benefit of 
information security investment. Their study analyzed the economics of information security 
investment by comparing the expected benefits of information security investment with the 
monetary investment in security to protect the given information set.  
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The results indicate that, for a given potential loss, a firm should not necessarily focus its 
investments on the information sets with the highest vulnerability. A firm may be better off 
concentrating its efforts on information sets with midrange vulnerabilities. This study also 
suggested that for two broad classes of security breach probability functions, the optimal 
amount to spend on information security never exceeds 37% of the expected loss resulting from 
a security breach.  
In decision-theoretic studies, it is usually assumed that firms will maximize their expected net 
benefits (e.g., Gordon & Loeb 2002; Shim, 2011; Willemson, 2006, 2010) or profits (e.g., 
Bohme & Felegyhazi, 2010; Lee et al., 2011). Huang et al. (2008) used a function of expected 
utility considering a risk-averse firm.  Similarly, Kort et al. (1999) develops a model where the 
firm has the possibility to reduce criminal losses by building up a stock of security capital. The 
result shows that in the case of the existence of a long-run steady-state equilibrium, the firm 
fixes its investment in security equipment. In a model extension, Kort et al. (1999) take into 
consideration a firm’s reputation affecting the level of investment in security equipment. 
Huang et al. (2006) and Huang & Behara (2013) proposed economic models showing how a 
firm should allocate its limited security budget to defend against two types of security attacks 
(distributed and targeted), simultaneously. The result indicates that a firm with a small security 
budget is better off allocating most or all of its investment on measures against one of the 
classes of attack; when the potential loss from the targeted attacks and the system vulnerability 
is relatively large. The firm should allocate most of its budget to prevent such attacks.  
There are also risk management analyses based on decision theory (e.g., Bojanc & Jerman-
Blažic, 2008b; Hoo, 2000). Huang and Goo (2009) built a general model to manage information 
security investment and applied the general model to different scenarios of information 
security, including directed attacks, risk-averse decision makers, and attacker inclination. Their 
results suggested that the relative size of potential losses is an important factor in determining 
the level of optimal investment and that the total investment may drop when system 
vulnerability is high. A risk-averse firm would always invest more than the information 
security risk but never more than the expected loss. Likewise, Huang (2010) developed a model 
argued that current economic models of security investment focus on risk reduction as the 
primary effect of security investments, assuming that they generate no direct business benefit; 
however, some potential business values, such as brand reputation and data stability, are 
important considerations in optimizing security investments. 
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In game-theoretic studies, it is assumed that both players will maximize their payoffs. 
Cavusoglu et al. (2004) developed functions of expected payoff for both the firm and the 
hacker. Cremonini and Nizovtsev (2006) and Grossklags et al. (2008) established a function of 
expected payoff for hackers. When utilizing game-theoretic analyses, it is essential to 
understand hacker’s strategy, however, research shows that it is difficult to determine the 
rationality of hackers as they may be motivated by a different value system (Wang et al. 2008). 
In game-theoretic analyses, it is also assumed that players will maximize their profits (e.g., 
Hausken, 2006; Cavusoglu et al., 2008). On the other hand, in some studies, it is assumed that 
firms will minimize their costs (e.g., Cavusoglu & Raghunathan, 2004; Bandyopadhyay et al., 
2005; Cavusoglu et al., 2005; Liu et al., 2005; Liu et al., 2011).   
Complete information is not directly mentioned in decision-theoretical studies. Yet, complete 
information is implicitly applied in game-theoretical studies, in which the solution to the game 
involves maximization (or minimization) of a polynomial function. For this to occur, the firm 
needs to know the hacker’s payoff function, and vice versa (e.g., Cavusoglu et al., 2004; 
Cavusoglu & Raghunathan, 2004; Bandyopadhyay et al., 2005; Cavusoglu et al., 2005; Jonsson 
& Olovsson, 1997; Leeson & Coyne, 2006; Liu et al., 2005; Gao et al., 2013a, 2013b). 
3.1.2 The effectiveness of IS security investment 
 
In the literature, information security investments have been evaluated in terms of their 
economic effectiveness and efficiency (Kwon & Johnson 2014). There are micro-economic 
approaches based on game theory (Grossklags et al., 2008; Sun et al., 2008).  
The effectiveness of information security investments is usually evaluated in terms of financial 
metrics based on Return on Investment (ROI) (Gordon & Loeb, 2006; Purser, 2004; Mizzi, 
2010; Sonnenreich et al., 2006; Davis, 2005). The term Return on Investment (ROI), which is 
defined as the calculation of the financial return from an investment based on the financial 
benefits and costs of that investment, is usually used to refer to the measures of how effectively 
capital is being used to generate profit. Focusing more closely on investment security, Davis 
(2005) developed the term of return on security investment (ROSI), which is defined as the 
calculation of the financial return from an investment in security, such as an initiative or 
project, based on the financial benefits and costs of that investment. Net Present Value (NPV) 
and Internal Rate of Return (IRR) are also highly used financial indicators (e.g., Bojanc & 
Jerman-Blažic, 2008a; Bonjanc et al.,2012; Buck et al., 2008). 
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Information Security Investment Strategies 
 
There are two particular investment strategies that use both decision theory and game theory 
principles. This thesis is focused on these investment strategies: 
3.1.3 Weakest Link Approach 
 
One key insight from the economics of information security literature is that attackers bent on 
undermining a system's security, operate strategically (Anderson & Moore, 2006; Cremonini 
& Nizovtsev, 2006). Moreover, information systems are often structured so that a system's 
overall security depends on its weakest link (Grossklags et al., 2008; Varian, 2004). Attackers 
have repeatedly exhibited a talent for identifying the easiest way to bypass a system’s security, 
even when the system’s designer remains unaware of the particular weakness (Bohme & 
Moore, 2009). Bier et al. (2007), use a general game-theoretic setting to study strategic 
interactions between a single attacker and a defender who optimized the allocation of defenses 
to multiple targets. Here, the defenders have to cope with uncertainty about an assumed hidden 
preference of the attacker to target a particular target. 
Bohme and Moore (2009) proposed a model for security investment that reflects the 
interactions between a defender and an attacker. The defender faces uncertainty and repeatedly 
targets the weakest link. The model explains that underinvestment might reasonably occur 
when a) reactive investment is possible; b) uncertainty exists about the attacker’s relative 
capability to exploit different threats; c) successful attacks are not catastrophic; and d) the sunk 
cost to upgrade the defense configuration is relatively small.  
3.1.4 Wait-And-See Approach 
 
Firms tend to take a reactive, rather than proactive, approach toward cybersecurity investments 
related to their organizations according to Gordon et al. (2003). Gordon et al. (2003) suggest 
that a reactive approach toward the deployment of measures to strengthen cybersecurity beyond 
some basic minimum may be consistent with an entirely rational economic perspective. The 
essence of the argument is that, given a fixed amount to spend on cybersecurity measures and 
uncertainties surrounding security breaches, it may make sense to hold a portion of the budget 




By deferring the decision on spending the reserve, managers may obtain a clearer picture about 
whether such spending is warranted. In a wait-and-see scenario, actual losses do occur if and 
when a breach occurs, but the magnitude of those losses may be lower than the expected 
benefits of waiting, and so on balance, it may well pay to wait. This approach is analogous to 
the deferment option often discussed in the modern economics literature on capital budgeting 
(e.g., Pindyck, 1991). 
 
3.2 Literature Review Summary 
 
The following tables summarize the concepts and variables obtained after the literature review. 
Table 1 presents the main concepts regarding information security investment strategies that 
will be the base of the interactions between defender and attacker in the system dynamics 
model. Table 2 shows the identified variables with their cause, effect and their polarity.  
Table 1 Relevant Concepts found in the literature of Information Security 
Concept Definition Source 
Reputation A favorable and publicly recognized name or 
standing for merit, achievement, reliability etc. In 
this case, reputation is referred to the public 
prestige of a company. 
 (Gordon & Richardson, 
2004)   
(Huang, 2010) 
(Kort et al., 1999) 
 
 
Vulnerability  The level of safety that assets of a company 
possess. It can also be referred as the level of 
protection of an asset. 
(Bojanc et al., 2012) 
(Cavusoglu et al. (2008) 
(Gordon & Loeb, 2002) 
(Huang & Goo, 2009) 
(Wang et al., 2009) 
(Willemson, 2006; 2010) 
Security 
Vectors 
Security vectors are externally visible and 
accessible system resources that can be used to 
mount an attack on the system and subsequently 
weighted according to the potential damage that 
could be caused by any given exploitation of a 
vulnerability 
Examples of security vectors are: network servers, 
webpages, e-mail, mobile devices, system 
configuration, among others. 
(Howard & LeBlanc, 
2002) 




Available resources to be allocated among assets to 
increase the level of asset resistance. Once these 
capabilities are invested in certain asset, these will 
infer in costs for the defenders. 
(Bodin, 2005) 
(Huang et al., 2006) 
(Huang & Behara, 2013) 
(Wang et al., 2009) Attackers 
Capabilities 
Portion of attackers’ resources available to be 
allocated among defender’s assets. 
Fraction of 
Investment 
The portion of capabilities dedicated to protect the 
company’s assets. 





(Cavusoglu et al., 2004) 
(Gordon & Loeb, 2002)  
(Gordon et al., 2003; 
2015) 
(Hausken, 2006) 
(Huang & Goo, 2009) 




Amount of attacks that attackers distribute among 
defenders’ security vectors in correspondence to 
the historical successful attacks. Once these 
capabilities are addressed to certain vector, these 
will infer in costs for the attackers. 
(Anderson & Moore, 
2006) 
Cavusoglu et al (2005) 
Cavusoglu et al. (2008) 
Cremonini & Nizovtsev 
(2006) (Hausken, 2006) 
(Huang & Goo, 2009) 




Criminal attacks that able to breach defenses of 
assets through security vectors. 
(Bohme & Felegyhazi, 
2010) 
(Bohme & Moore, 2009) 
(Gordon & Loeb, 2002)  
(Huang et al., 2008) 
Defenders 
Profit 
Monetary gain from increasing the level of 
resistance of the assets, which in turn increases 
reputation, thus increasing financial performance. 
(Bojanc et al., 2012) 
(Bojanc & Jerman-Blažic, 
2008) 
(Cavusoglu et al., 2008) 
(Cavusoglu & 
Raghnuthan, 2010) (Davis, 
2005) 
(Huang, 2010) 
(Kwon & Johnson 2014) 
(Lee et al., 2011) 
(Mizzi, 2010) 
(Purser, 2004) 
(Sonnenreich et al., 2006)  
Attackers 
Wealth 
Monetary advantage from breaching defenders’ 
assets. 
Cremonini & Nizovtsev 
(2006) 
(Grossklags et al., 2008) 




The weakest link strategy consists on the attacker 
rationally putting more effort into attacking 
systems with low security levels. Once the 
perimeter of an organization is breached, it is often 
possible for attackers to leverage this advantage. 
(Bier et., 2007) 
(Bohme & Moore,2009) 
(Cavusoglu et al., 2008) 






Gordon et al. (2003), present a wait-and-see 
approach based on real options. The basic idea of 
their approach is that in case of uncertainty 
regarding expected benefits, it may be better to 
wait for key events to occur. As soon as the 
security breach occurs, more information to assess 
the expected benefits of a security investment is 
available, making the assessment more accurate. 
(Bohme & Moore, 2009) 
(Cavusoglu et al., 2014)  






Table 2 Identified variables in the literature of Information Security 





Negative Reputation Building Up Positive 
Financial 
Performance of the 
Defender 
Vulnerability in 






































Vulnerability in security 




























Note 1: Positive polarity means that the relationship between the variables amplifying and negative polarity means that 
the relationship is counteracting. 
Note 2: The tables can be read in the following way: The higher Vulnerability in Security vectors, the lower the 
Reputation Building Up variable. Therefore, the higher Reputation Building Up, the higher the Financial Performance 




Chapter 4: Model Description 
After the systematic literature review was concluded, a system dynamics model to study the 
dynamics described in the literature of information security investments, was built. This 
chapter, together with Chapter 5 aims to answer the second research question. This chapter 
describes the structure of the system; attention will be placed on providing a model overview 
and a description of each sub- model. Finally, the overall unified structure of the model will be 
described in terms of how sectors interact with each other from a feedback loop perspective. 
4.1 Model Overview 
This section defines the boundary of the model and the major assumptions included in the 
model. Together, all these elements provide an overview of the model in a way that the reader 
can understand the operation of the model generally without referring to technical 
specifications.  
As mentioned in previous chapters, the model focuses on the dynamics of the attacker and 
defender interactions in the information security field to discover the investment strategies 
applied by the adversaries.  
The model presents a firm, that represents the Defender, which is protecting an asset against a 
set of hackers, representing the Attackers that are trying to breach the security of the firm’s 
asset with malicious cyber-attacks. The asset can take many forms, such as a list of customers, 
a website, an accounts payable ledger or a strategic plan. The increased security could be with 
respect to protecting the asset’s confidentiality, integrity, authenticity or availability to 
authorized users.  
There exist three possible threats, which can be regarded as distinct security vectors of access 
of a single asset of the company. Each threat can be secured by investing in its corresponding 
defense. For each security vector, there is one way to access and one way to defend. Lastly, 
defenses are effective if they can compensate for the incoming attacks.  
As illustrated in Figure 2, the model consists of three sub-models: Defender Sub-model, 

























Using the concept of wargames4 in organizations known as Red Teaming5 and Blue Teaming6 
to help differentiate each of the adversaries, this model contains color distinctions for defenders 
with blue color and attackers with red color. The area where the two opponents interact is called 
Battlefield and is represented in purple color. 
                                                          
4 Wargame exercises are akin to Threat Modeling, though geared to the security response process and 
personnel of an organization or service dealing with an attack. The intent of war gaming is improving 
security incident response procedures by engaging personnel from different groups inside the 
organization (Microsoft, 2014). 
 
5 Red Teaming refers to the use of real-world breach tactics for attack and penetration. Red Teaming 
takes the theoretical aspect of war-gaming and makes it real (Microsoft, 2014). 
 
6 The Blue Team follows established security processes and uses the latest tools and technologies to detect 
and respond to attacks and penetration.  (Microsoft, 2014). 
 
 
Figure 2 Sub-models Diagram 
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4.2 Model Boundary 
 
To gain intuition into the dynamics of attacker-defender interactions, a quantitative and 
integrative dynamic model with a suitable boundary, time horizon and realistic interpretation 
of strategic decision making by individuals, is essential.   
The model is run in 100 periods representing months, long enough to capture the delayed and 
indirect effects of the strategies applied by attackers and defenders. Table 3 summarizes the 
scope of the model by listing and classifying which key variables are included endogenously, 
which are exogenous and which are excluded from the model.  
Endogenous  Exogenous Excluded 
Reputation Defenders Capabilities Type of Attacker 
Successful Attacks Attackers Capabilities Type of Attack 
Vulnerability of Vectors Attack Unitary Cost Financial Indicators 
Defenders’ Financial Performance   
Attackers’ Performance   
 
4.3 Major Assumptions 
Assumption 1: Effect of cyber-attacks on the firm’s reputation. 
There are both direct and indirect costs associated with cybersecurity breaches. The direct costs 
to companies include the money spent on intrusion-detection systems, overtime for staff fixing 
compromised systems, and productivity lost during virus attacks, for example. However, these 
are cost that companies face in the day-to-day operation of their business in an internet world. 
Although, not perfectly, these costs can be measured by the companies. Direct costs of cyber 
security, are not considered in this study. 
The real financial damage due to cybersecurity breaches comes from indirect costs (Gordon & 
Richardson, 2004). These can be damages caused by lost sales, weakened customers 
relationships and legal liabilities. It is difficult to measure indirect costs, but it is worth paying 




Table 3 Model Boundary 
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A company’s reputation is fundamental to their economic future. Damage on reputation is 
considered an indirect cost that a company faces against cyber-attacks. An advertisement, or 
article containing a security breach, can affect their reputation and financial performance. An 
example of this is a virus attack to a bank’s ATMs causing them to shut down for a few hours, 
this may bother the customers, but they will probably not change banks over such an incident. 
Nonetheless, if a bank is hacked and customer data is circulated on the internet, customers may 
well decide to take their business elsewhere. In the latter case, the breach has marked negative 
impact of the reputation and therefore on the market value of the company because of the real 
potential for lost future revenue as customers choose to change banks (Kiely & Benzel, 2006). 
This model assumes a value for each of the three vector of security as the weight they place on 
their reputation, together with the status of the vectors vulnerability and successful attacks. 
Simulations will provide insight into the value a company places on cyber security in regard to 
preserving their reputation. 
Assumption 2: Capabilities of defenders and attackers are exogenous parameters. 
A firm’s ability to invest in information security, or everything else for that matter, is limited 
by its finances. In particular, information security has to compete with other projects for 
funding (Tipton & Kreuse, 2006). Given the budget limitations, the greater challenge to 
managing information security is not so much the total of investment level needed, but the 
allocation of the finite resources to defend against attacks (Huang & Behara, 2013).  
In general, large companies a specified budget to take care of security incidents. Then, 
depending on the size of the company and the type of industry it belongs to, the capabilities of 
firms will differ. This model assumes a relatively big-sized company since the budget for 
information security is independent of the firm’s financial performance. In other words, the 
budget dedicated to invest in information security, in this case, is fixed and available for every 
period of the simulation. 
The attackers’ capabilities are also assumed to be constant for each period. In the real system, 
hackers are criminal organizations who operate under their own business model. Consequently, 
it is not known how exactly the attackers behave and on what they build their business case 
and, in this case, how they shape their resources for future attacks. The model here reflects the 




Assumption 3: Attack Unitary Cost 
The attack unitary cost denotes the ratio between attackers’ and defenders’ capabilities. This 
parameter represents the damage that each fraction of attack causes to the defenders’ 
performance. In other words, the attack unitary cost is how much money it takes for the 
defender to stop an attack. 
In the model, the attack unitary cost is exogenous. This parameter will be multiplying the 
attackers’ capabilities in order to determine the vulnerability status of each security vector. 
Assumption 4: Type of Attackers and Type of Attacks 
Cyber-attacks can originate from inside or outside the company. The model does not 
differentiate between internal attackers and external attackers. Internal attackers include 
disgruntled employees and negligent employees who employ a weak password for accessing 
the system or click on a link from a phishing site without knowing it is a malware. The other 
type of attacker is external which in general, include criminal activist hacking organizations. 
Instead, attackers in this model are identical and there is an unspecified number of them. 
In addition, the model does not parse the attacks into different types, e.g., denial of service, 
phishing, virus, ransomware, SQL injections and so on.  
 
Assumption 5: Security Cost of Defenders 
In this study, the security cost that the defenders incur when making an investment decision 
each period is portrayed in the decision rule of the fraction of investment they dedicate to each 
security vector when this is breached.  
However, what is not depicted in the model, are different financial indicators and approaches 
to analyze each investment decision such as: Cost-benefit analysis, risk analysis, Net Present 
Value (NPV), Annual Loss Expectation (ALE), Return of Security Investment (ROSI), among 
others. The reason for this, is that a financial analysis would require a more sophisticated model 
including empirical evidence to give more accuracy to the research. Additionally, the time 





4.4 Model Structure 
 
4.4.1 Stock and Flow Diagram 
 
 In the case of quantitative system dynamics modelling, stock and flow diagrams are the tool 
by which model structure is defined, represented and evaluated. Model structure from a system 
dynamics perspective can be defined as the set of stocks, flows and auxiliary variables by which 
the representation of any system is achieved.  
Stocks are variables in which quantities accumulate over time, these are represented by 
rectangles. Flows are the variables affecting stocks and through which accumulation or 
depletion of stocks occur and are represented by arrows and valve symbols (Forrester, 1961). 
Stocks accumulate (integrate) their inflows less their outflows. Thus, a stock and flow map 
corresponds to a system of integral or differential equations. Units of measure can also help 
identify stock and flows. If a stock is measured in units, its flows must be measured in units 
per time period (Sterman, 2000). 
Auxiliary variables serve either to represent external parameters (parameters outside of the 
system’s influence) or as the intermediate steps by which stocks and flows affect each other 
through feedback mechanisms to add conceptual clarity to the model (Richardson & Pugh, 
1981; Sterman, 2000).  
Model structure represents both the qualitative dimension of the system, through the causal 
linking of variables, and its quantitative dimension, through the formal definition of these 
causal links through equations. The complete documentation of the model, including all 
equations, variable units, and reference to the source of estimated values as well as general 
notes of some formulations, is presented in the Appendix. 
As shown in Figure 3, the system dynamics model contains three sub-models:  
 Defender Sub-model  
 Battlefield Sub-model  
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4.5 Sub-models Description 
 
The following section describes the structure of each sub-model in terms of stock and flows 
and main formulations. 
4.5.1 Defender Sub-model 
Figure 4 illustrates the Defender Sub-model structure. This sub-model represents the firm’s 
defense structure against malicious cyber-attacks that are trying to breach the security of its 
information asset. In each period, the defender makes a security investment decision to define 
his configuration of defenses. Defenders are assumed to have a basic security on each vector 
and their security capabilities are destined to cover the additional security efforts resulting from 
security breaches.  
As shown in this figure, the defender is protecting his asset through three security vectors (A, 
B and C), which have a value that will be translated into reputation and afterwards to financial 
performance. In the model, the security vectors are represented as each vector’s vulnerability 
status. 
 

















































































Reported Successful Attacks 
 
There are three stocks of reported successful attacks, one for each security vector symbolized 
by the notation i to represent vectors A, B and C.  
Stock: Reported Successful Attacksi 
Init: A constant number, they are initialized in 5 Attacks 
Inflow: Reports= Successful Attacks/Time to report Attack 
Outflow: Dismissed= Number of Dismissed Attacks/Dismissal time 
 
Each stock has an inflow of successful attacks on that specific vector, per the time it takes to 
the defender to report successful attacks (1 month). The outflows of these stocks are the number 
of dismissed attacks that were reported divided into the time it takes for defenders to dismiss 
such attacks (1 month). The model was calibrated to determine the value of 3 as an assumed 
constant number of attacks to be discarded every period. 
 
Fraction Investment Vectors 
 
The fraction of investment for each vector is calculated by the reported successful attacks 
divided into the sum of the reported successful attacks of all three vectors. The following 
equation is an example of the Fraction of Investment formulated of the defense in Vector A 
and it is the same formulation for the other two vectors. 
Fraction Investment Vector A= Reported Successful Attacks Vector A/ (Reported Successful Attacks 
Vector A+Reported Successful Attacks Vector B +Reported Successful Attacks Vector C) 
This equation dictates that the defender will invest a percentage in vector A which is equal to 
the total successful attacks he has received on that vector. 
 
Reputation 
Reputation is represented as a stock that accumulates in Reppoints over the course of each 
simulation period. The inflow of reputation is the Building Up rate derived by an adjustment 
of reputation which is in turn the result of the sum of the values of each security vector and 





Init: A constant number, it is initialized in 50 reppoints 
Inflow: Building Up= IF(Adjustment>0, (Adjustment/Time to build up reputation),0) 
Outflow: Erosion= IF (Adjustment<0, (ABS (Adjustment/'Time reputation loss)),0)  
 
The initial value of the stock is 50, being this number the current reputation that the firm has 
in the beginning of the simulation period. What this inflow represents is the following decision 
rule: reputation building up rate will increase, whenever the adjustment is positive. In contrast, 
when the adjustment is negative, the outflow of erosion will increase, meaning that the firm is 
losing reputation. 
Adjustment= Indicated Reputation-Reputation 
The adjustment is the gap between the indicated reputation and the current reputation of the 
company. The adjustment will be determined by the result in indicated reputation, which is a 
linear funcion of the vectors vulnerability, being the base reputation (100 reppoints) the 
intercept of this function. 
Indicated Reputation= Base reputation-(Vector A Value*Vulnerability Vector A+Vector B 
Value*Vulnerability Vector B+Vector C Value*Vulnerability Vector C) 
Defenders Financial Performance 
The defenders’ financial performance is formulated by the sum of the current reputation per 
the reputation to money rate, which indicates how much the reputation points are worth in 
money, plus the base financial performance of the firm (50 Euros). 
Defenders Financial Performance= (Reputation to money rate*Reputation)+Base financial 
performance 
The Defenders’ Profit is given by the financial performance; this stock was built for analysis 
purposes in the following scenario and policy options analysis. 
Stock: Defenders Accumulated Profit 
Init: A constant number, it is initialized in 0 Euros 






4.5.2 Battlefield Sub-model 
 
The Battlefield Sub-model is the segment of the model where defenders and attackers interact 
with their respective capabilities and investment decisions. The main components of this sub-
models are Vulnerability and Successful Attacks of each security vectors. Figure 5, depicts the 
battlefield sub-model: 
 
Figure 5 Battlefield Sub-Model Structure 
Vulnerability in Vectors 
Vulnerability stands for the level of security in place on each vector. If the vulnerability is 
positive, it means the system is weak in security. Vulnerability is calculated by: 
Vulnerability Vector A= (Attackers Capabilities*Fraction of Attack Vector A*Attack Unitary Cost)-
(Defenders Capabilities*Fraction Investment Vector A) 
Vulnerability Vector B= (Attackers Capabilities*Fraction of Attack Vector B*Attack Unitary Cost)-
(Defenders Capabilities*Fraction Investment Vector B) 
Vulnerability Vector C= (Attackers Capabilities*Fraction of Attack Vector C*Attack Unitary Cost)-
(Defenders Capabilities*Fraction Investment Vector C) 
Basically, vulnerability is defined by the difference between the resources that the attacker 
destines for the correspondent vector and the resources the defender allocates to fix security 
flaws in the same vector. The attacker’s resources are given by his capabilities per the fraction 
of capabilities dedicated to attack the vector per the money to attack equivalent for each attack. 
Similarly, the defender’s resources result from multiplying his capabilities and fraction 













































































Successful Attacks in Vectors 
 
The successful attacks are essential to this model since they will trigger the future investment 
decisions for both adversaries. Successful Attacks are calculated by: 
Successful Attacks Vector A= IF(Vulnerability Vector A>0,(('Attackers Capabilities*Fraction of 
Attack Vector A)-((Defenders Capabilities*Fraction Investment Vector A)/Attack Unitary Cost)),0) 
Successful Attacks Vector B= IF(Vulnerability Vector B>0,(('Attackers Capabilities*Fraction of 
Attack Vector B)-((Defenders Capabilities*Fraction Investment Vector B)/Attack Unitary Cost)),0) 
Successful Attacks Vector C= IF(Vulnerability Vector B>0,(('Attackers Capabilities*Fraction of 
Attack Vector C)-((Defenders Capabilities*Fraction Investment Vector C)/Attack Unitary Cost)),0) 
 
This formulation entails that if the vector vulnerability is lower than zero, then there will be 
zero successful attacks since the defender has equal or superior capabilities than the attacker 
and he is capable to stop all attacks. On the other hand, if the vector vulnerability is higher than 
zero, there will be successful attacks. 
The multiplication of defender’s capabilities per the fraction of investment and then divided 
into the attack unitary cost, suggests the amount of attacks that the defender can stop whenever 
a security breach happens. So, the difference between the number of attacks addressed to each 
vector and the number of attacks the defender is able to halt from breaching the defenses, is 
equal to the total successful attacks. 
4.5.3 Attacker Sub-model 
 
The attacker sub-model is simple. An attacker targets this firm and puts a certain amount of 
effort into attacks. Since, the attacker does not know where to aim in order to get benefits, he 
sends an initial attack distribution according to what is it initially perceived to be vulnerable. 
The attacker identifies and exploits the weakest link, that is, the security vector with the lowest 
protection. If the attacker succeeds, he profits, which will mean lower financial performance 
for the defender. The attacker does not operate indiscriminately, rather he only attacks when it 
is profitable to do so. 
Historical successful attacks in the attacker’s model, encourages to attack the weakest link and 
do not neglect the other vectors, assigning a smaller portion of resources to attack those. It is 
assumed that the attacker receives the same utility for exploiting all security vectors. 
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The following figure illustrates the structure of the attacker’s sub-model: 
 
Figure 6 Attacker Sub-Model Structure 
Accumulated Successful Attacks 
 
The stock of accumulated successful attacks of each vector, allow the attacker to identify the 
weakest link and determine the next attack decisions to exploit the most vulnerable security 
vector. The notation i, indicates Vectors A, B and C. 
Stock: Accumulated Successful Attacks Vector i 
Init: A constant number, they are initialized in 5 Attacks 
Inflow: Breaches= 'Successful Attacks Vector i/Time to report attack 
The inflow of this stock is given by the successful attacks in vector i, divided into the time it 
takes attackers to report attacks (1 month).  
Fraction of Attack Vectors 
 
The fraction of attacks are the decisions attackers make resulting from the accumulated 
successful attacks on each vector. In order for the weakest link strategy to operate in this model, 
attackers have to switch from one vector to the other when the current vector is not being 



















































For this reason, the past value parameter is in place to store the previous value of the previous 
period to be able to compare the current value of the attack with the past value of the 
accumulated successful attacks in the last period and determine if it is increasing or decreasing 
to make the decision of changing vectors or not. 
Past Value= DELAYPPL(Accumulated Successful Attacks Vector i,1,0) 
Switch= IF(Accumulated Successful Attacks Vector i-Past value i<1,0,1) 
The switch parameter is a conditional that indicates that when the comparison of current value 
with past value is lower than 1, then the switch becomes zero and it is not beneficial for the 
attacker to continue exploiting that vector and jumps to another one. The conditional is towards 
1 and not zero because 1 is a threshold to evaluate the different between the two values that 
must be at least equal to one to justify the change. 
This is an example of the calculation of the Fraction of attack of Vector A, however is the same 
for the rest of the vectors: 
Fraction of Attack Vector A= Switch A*Accumulated Successful Attacks Vector A/(Accumulated 
Successful Attacks Vector A+Switch B*Accumulated Successful Attacks Vector B+Switch 
C'*Accumulated Successful Attacks Vector C) 
Whenever an attacker makes the decision to stop attacking one vector and swith to another, 
then the investment directed to the other two vectors will increase. 
Attackers Performance 
 
The attackers’ performance is the sum of the breaches of all vectors and multiplied by the attack 
unitary cost: 
Attackers Performance= ((Breaches Vector A) +(Breaches Vector B)+('Breaches Vector C))*Attack 
Unitary Cost 
The Attackers Wealth is given by the financial performance; this stock was built for analysis 
purposes in the following scenario and policy options analysis. The inflow of the attackers’ 
wealth is a function of the attackers’ performance. 
Stock: Accumulated Attackers Wealth 
Init: A constant number, it is initialized in 0 Euros 




4.6 Feedback Analysis 
 
This chapter provides a general description of the model in terms of its main feedback loops. 
Richardson & Pugh defined feedback “as a closed sequence of causes and effects, that is, a 
closed path of action and information” (1981, p. 4). All dynamics arise from the interactions 
of two types of feedback loops: reinforcing loops (R) that amplify whatever is happening in 
the system and balancing loops (B) that counteract or oppose changes.  
Feedback is one of the fundamental concepts of System Dynamics. However, humans have 
cognitive capacity limitations, thus, mental models often fail to include the critical feedbacks 
determining the dynamics of systems (Forrester 1992; Vennix, 1996). System dynamics uses 
diagramming tools to capture the structure of systems, including causal loop and stock and 
flow diagrams.  
Causal loop diagrams (CLDs) are an important tool for representing the feedback structure of 
systems (Coyle, 2000; Wolstenholme & Coyle, 1983). CLD is a representation that consists of 
variables connected by arrows denoting the causal-and-effect relationships among the variables 
(Coyle, 2000; Richardson, 2013). Causal relationships support the clarification of the actual 
structure of the examined problem, as the clear picture of the problem’s structure improves 
understanding of the observed phenomena (Forrester & Senge, 1980). 
CLDs are commonly used in academic work and in business for: system boundary definition, 
eliciting and capturing the mental models of individuals or teams, communicating the important 
feedbacks responsible for a problem, raising awareness about unexpected consequences and 
identifying policy levers (Sterman, 2000). A causal diagram consists of variables connected by 
arrows denoting the causal influences among variables. The arrows with two lines denote some 
delays between two linked variables.  Each causal link is assigned a polarity, either positive 
(+) or negative (-) to indicate how the dependent variable changes when the independent 
variable changes. Note that the loop identifier circulates in the same direction as the loop to 
which it corresponds.  
To simplify the model’s representation of the dynamic hypothesis, a causal loop diagram 
(CLD) was built and it is shown in Figure 7. Loops representing Defenders’ actions are 
















Figure 7 CLD of Defender-Attacker dynamic interactions in Information Security Investments 
 
The core structure (or the main causal loops) of the model is based on the dynamic interactions 
between the actions of the attackers and the target firm (defenders), influencing and influenced 
by factors as, capabilities, perceived benefits, and perceived ease of attack (Cremonini & 
Nizovtsev, 2006; Jonsson & Olovsson, 1997; Leeson & Coyne, 2006).  
Each process in this CLD, is common to numerous literature of the Wait-And-See (WAS) and 
Weakest Link (WL) approaches and each link has support from empirical studies (Gordon & 
Loeb 2002; Gordon et al. 2003; Varian, 2004; Bohme & Moore, 2009).  The novelty of this 
framework arises from the combination of these approaches to describe the complex 
interactions of defenders (companies) and attackers (hackers) when making investment 
decisions on security vectors A, B and C.  
As the figure illustrates, important model variables and the causal relationships among these 
variables are linked by arrows with polarities. In this CLD, there are three reinforcing loops 













































The main feedback loop is a reinforcing one, that is, the Weakest Link loop where the 
successful attacks lead to more attacks. Although those dynamics is plausible, the implied result 
of zero or infinite number of attacks from this reinforcement is unrealistic. Constraining such 
a reinforcing loop, the firm’s investments in information security and the effectiveness of such 
investments, takes place as the Wait-and-see loop. Next, these two main feedback loops will 
be explained individually. 
The Weakest Link loop for security vector A, B and C. These are the actions that a rational 
attacker take when planning the number of attacks to address to defenders’ asset. The higher 
the vector’s vulnerability, the higher the successful attacks. The vector’s vulnerability will be 
determined by the ratio between the defenders’ capabilities and attackers’ capabilities. As 
successful attacks increase, there will be more number of attacks on vectors will increase as 
well. Therefore, the higher the number of attacks, the higher the vector’s vulnerability will be 
because the vector will be overloaded with attacks, therefore, making it more vulnerable. 
 
                              Figure 8 Weakest Link Loop 
 
As shown in Figure 8, whenever there is a weakest link identified, the attacker will focus on 
the least protected, dedicating less resources to the other vectors. The attacker will not stop 
attacking the other two vectors, instead, she will continue attacking them in lower proportions 
in case, another weakest link is found. This happens because the attacker expects that the 






















On the other hand, the Wait and See loop for vector’s A, B and C operates when defenders 
make investment decisions based on their reported successful attacks. The higher the successful 
attacks, the higher the investment on vectors’ security. The more investment, the more level of 
security of assets, thus, the lower the vulnerability to attacks. Therefore, the lower the 







                                  
 
                                  Figure 9 Wait-and-see Loop 
Figure 9, illustrates how defenders allocate their resources whenever the weakest link is 
exploited. This means the defenders is acting reactively to attacks and trying to fix the flaws in 
security of each vectors. However, as attackers do, even if defenders focus most of their 
investment in the vector that is being attacked the most, they still protect the other two assets 
but in lower proportions. The fraction of investment of the other non-weakest link vectors will 




























Effect of vulnerability in financial performance of 
Defenders and Attackers 
 
The result of the vulnerability of the vectors will 
translate into reputation, which will improve or worsen 
the defender’s financial performance.  
The higher the vulnerability of vectors, the lower the 
reputation of the firm. Therefore, the lower financial 
performance and profits. The same happens for 
attackers, an increase in vulnerability leads to an 






















Chapter 5: Behavior Analysis 
 
The model behavior is depicted in this chapter, answering the second research question. The 
simulations resulting from the base run and equilibrium run are shown and analyzed. The 
behavior analysis is an essential part of this study since it will be the basis simulation to later 
validate the model and to explore the scenarios and policy options. The model was constructed 
in Powersim Studio Software, version 9. The simulation specifications are the following:  
 Integration Method: Runge-Kutta (4th order) 
 Time Unit: Months 
 Time Step: 0.25 
 Time Horizon: 100 months 
 
5.1 Base Run  
 
The baseline run is the model simulation in “Business-as-usual” state. The weakest link 
mechanism is the one that triggers the investment strategies both for attackers and defenders, 
since also defenders need to identify where is the weakest link in their vectors to decide where 
to invest and how much. The weakest link mechanism operates under initial conditions 
reflected in the accumulated successful attacks in the attackers’ sub-model.  
The initial conditions on the attackers accumulated successful attacks will set the subsequent 
actions for both adversaries. Whenever there is one security vector breached in the defense, 
considerably higher than the other vectors, there will be exploitations by the attackers. For the 
base run, the initial conditions for accumulated successful attacks are: 
Accumulated Successful Attacks Vector A 10 
Accumulated Successful Attacks Vector B 7 
Accumulated Successful Attacks Vector C 5 
                                            Table 4 Base Run: Accumulated Successful Attacks Initial Conditions 
In this case, vector A is the clear weakest link identified by the attacker in the first period. 
These initial values were selected this way, to visualize the preference that the attacker has for 
one of the vectors in comparison with the rest. However, there is a second-preferred vector 




The key variables considered in the baseline simulation runs are Successful Attacks (A, B, C), 
Security Vectors (A, B, C), Investment/Attack in Security Vectors (A, B, C), Defenders and 
Attackers Performance.  
Successful Attacks for all three vectors are portrayed in Figure 11. An interesting observation 
can be pointed out in this graph, as it exhibits the switches from one vector to the other in attack 










Simultaneously, as successful attacks happen, the vulnerabilities in vector A, B and C are also 
changing according to the interactions of Attackers and Defenders. This means that when the 
attackers capabilities outweigh the defenders’ capabilities, the vulnerability in the vector that 
is most fired upon will experience a positive vulnerability or negative security level. The 
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Figure 11 Base Run: Successful Attacks 
Figure 12 Base Run: Vulnerability of Vectors 
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To understand deeper the dynamics of the investment decisions executed by both adversaries 
when the weakest link mechanism is activated, the following figure shows how Attackers and 
Defenders operate per their respective capabilities. The dynamics of these interactions are 
depicted in Figure 13.  
When the attacker identifies the weakest link in the defense, she will leverage that advantage 
until there is no more benefits to take out from there, meanwhile the defender fixes the security 









Figures 14 and 15 show the defenders and attackers financial performance in the base run. It is 
clearly seen that in this case, both adversaries are increasing their monetary gains. However, 
defenders are able to defend their information asset effectively even though attackers are being 
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Figure 13 Base Run Investment/Attack in Security Vectors 
Figure 14 Base Run: Defenders Performance 
Figure 15 Base Run: Attackers Performance 
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5.1.1 Dynamic implications of the Base Run  
 
The system behavior in the base run exhibited the weakest link and wait-and-see strategies 
operating with initial conditions of accumulated successful attacks Vector A= 10, Vector B=7 
and Vector C= 5. It was observed that attackers are constantly finding the weakest link and 
exploiting it (Vector A). Then the attacker switches to the next weakest link whenever the 
defender blocks attacks, eventually. 
Meanwhile, defenders are fixing the defense flaws proportionally as the attacks happen on each 
vector. The financial performance of both defenders and attackers is visualized while each 
party is applying their investment strategy, as well as the status of the vulnerability of vectors. 
 
5.2 Equilibrium Run 
 
The equilibrium run differs from the base run simulation by introducing identical values to the 
accumulated successful attacks for attackers preventing them to apply the weakest link 
approach. For the equilibrium run, the initial conditions for accumulated successful attacks are: 
Accumulated Successful Attacks Vector A 5 
Accumulated Successful Attacks Vector B 5 
Accumulated Successful Attacks Vector C 5 
                                         
                                        Table 5 Equilibrium Run: Accumulated Successful Attacks Initial Conditions 
These initial values were introduced to portray the situation when there are no successful 
attacks because the amount of accumulated successful attacks from the attacker’s side and 
reported successful attacks are the same. 
The following figures represent the equilibrium run where attackers and defender’s capabilities 
are the same, there are no successful attacks because attackers do not find the weakest link and 
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Figure 18 Equilibrium Run: Investment/Attack in Security Vectors 
Figure 19 Equilibrium Run: Defenders Performance 
Figure 20 Equilibrium Run: Attackers Performance 
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Chapter 6: Model Validation 
 
6.1 Model Validation Overview 
 
Any audience for a model-based study want to know how much trust to place in analyses based 
upon the model. The system dynamics modeling process is iterative, in which various tests are 
used to scrutinize the model and to place confidence in its usefulness, such process generates 
insights into the relationships between system structure and behavior. The formal processes 
that lead people to place confidence in a model, are frequently referred to as the validation of 
the model (Richardson & Pugh, 1981). There is little agreement among different modeling 
methodologies about what a good validation is or should be. In fact, there is no general 
appropriate procedure for validation that a system dynamics model must go through to be 
considered as validated (Barlas, 1996; Sterman, 2000).  
The iterative approach to the formulation of a model is usually forced by the complexity of the 
problem being addressed. However, despite numerous iterations in the modeling process, no 
model has ever been or ever will be thoroughly validated (Greenberger et al., 1976), mostly 
because they are all simplified representations of reality. Therefore, all models are wrong as 
stated by Sterman (2000).  
Barlas and Erdem (1994), remark that validity in system dynamics refers to the internal 
structure of the model rather than the output behavior. Behavior replication alone is not 
sufficient to assume validity, as it is possible to obtain the “right behavior for the wrong 
reason”. Instead, models have a certain purpose against which their validity can be tested, then 
the validation process should be directed to achieve the goal of the model. 
Despite the limitations of validation restricting from its qualitative and iterative nature, Barlas 
(1996) proposed a logical sequence as a guideline for carrying out model validity tests in three 
stages: direct structural tests, structure-oriented tests, and behavior pattern prediction. Any of 
these tests by itself is certainly inadequate as an indicator of model validity. Taken together, 
they are a formidable filter, capable of trapping and weeding out weaker models and allowing 
those that are most likely to reflect something close to truth. The model in the present research 
follows this guideline. The procedures for conducting the tests are explained further together 




6.2 Structure Validity 
 
6.2.1 Direct Structure Tests 
 
Direct structure tests assess the validity of the model structure, by direct comparison with 
knowledge about real system structure. This means comparing each equation and logical 
function individually of the model with the relationships available knowledge about the real 
system. In such tests, there is no simulation involved. The following tests belong to the category 
of theoretical structure test which involve comparing the model structure with generalized 
knowledge about the system that exists in the literature given the purpose of this model as 




The goal of this test is to compare the model equations with the relationships that exist in the 
real system (Forrester & Senge, 1980), in this case, the conceptual foundation of the model is 
grounded in the systematic literature review in information security during the model-building 
process. An example of structure-confirmation performed during the modeling process relates 
to the structure of how the security level of each security vectors and the potential loss from 
such security vector, affects the investment strategy of the future distribution of capabilities 
among the vectors of access in order to protect the firm’s information asset. 
As portrayed in Figure 21, the most common used strategy by the defender to allocate 
information security expenditures is the “Wait-And-See” approach. Due to the uncertainty 
associated with potential information security breaches, security managers may consider 
economically rational to take a wait-and-see attitude toward spending the available security 
capabilities until a breach occurs. Once an attack is successful in a security vector, such attacks 
are constantly reported by the defense to be able to base their next decision of fraction of 
investments that will be addressed to the vector that is being breached the most. 
According to the real options literature (Gordon et al., 2003; Pindyck, 1991), waiting for key 
events to occur will often yield higher expected benefits from capital investments than acting 
as if the investment needs to be made now or never.  
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This literature shows that before one makes the investment, the net present value (NPV) of 
making an investment today, needs to be greater that the option value associated with deferring 
the decision until more information is available.17 
 
        Figure 21 Structure-confirmation test: Wait-And-See Strategy 
 
Parameter-confirmation Test  
 
This assessment makes sure that the values of all parameters are reasonable and every variable 
and constant has a clear real-life meaning. The parameter confirmation was constantly 
evaluated against the knowledge available in the literature, both conceptually and numerically.  
                                                          














































































The conceptual confirmation was performed by identifying the elements available in the 
literature that correspond to the parameters of the model. The numerical confirmation was 
conducted by estimating the numerical value of the parameter with enough accuracy and 
plausible ranges.  
Some technical parameters are created only for modeling purpose, while no real data is 
available. For instance, some technical parameters such as capabilities and attack unitary costs 
were estimated to illustrate the dynamics of defender and attacker investment strategies. 
Attacks can originate from inside or outside of the firm. The model does not differentiate 
between internal or external attackers. Similarly, it does differentiate between attacks on 
different information assets which are beyond this research scope.  
By examining the values for all the parameters in the model, it helps us to get a more accurate 
and reliable understanding of the model and we find out the aggregated structure is acceptable 
for the research purpose.  
Direct extreme-condition Test 
This test supports that each decision (model equations) result in plausible output under extreme 
values. The test was conducted by assessing the plausibility of the resulting values against the 
knowledge/anticipation of what would happen under a similar condition in the real system 
(Forrester & Senge). The output of this test can be deduced without needing simulation, it is 
applied by inspection of each equation in isolation. 
For each flow in the model, the equations were put into extreme conditions, tracing back as 
well the stocks involved. For instance, imaginary max and min values were introduced to the 
input variables and compare the value of the output variable to what would logically happen in 
the real system under same extreme conditions.   
To provide an example of this test, the flows Breaches for Attackers and Reported Attacks for 
Defenders were tested. These flows represent the attacks that were successful and driving 
attackers to identify and exploit the weakest link and defenders to also identify the weakest link 
and defend their asset.  
The flows are formulated by the following equations: 
Breaches Vector i = Successful Attacks/Time to report attack 
Reports Vector i = Successful Attacks/Time to report attack 
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Assuming that Defenders Capabilities drastically increase surpassing the Attackers 
Capabilities, there will be therefore no successful attacks and the defender will be benefited. 
Meanwhile, if the Attackers Capabilities increases radically outweighing the Defenders 
Capabilities, the successful attacks will increase dramatically harming the Defenders and 
favoring the Attackers. 
 
Dimensional Consistency Test 
 
A system dynamics model has dimension for each of its variables. The dimension for each 
variable is specified when the model is built, the dimensional consistency test reflects nothing 
more that unit error or missing units. The dimensional consistency test has been performed 
automatically by the system dynamics software employed for this research (Powersim Studio 
9), which does not allow the model to run without all equations being dimensionally consistent. 
This test helps assessing whether the units match on the left and right hand side of each equation 
without using any arbitrary “scaling” parameters that have no real world meaning (Barlas, 
1996; Sterman; 2000). This model is considered dimensionally consistent since it generates no 
unit error messages when running the simulations. 
6.2.2 Structure-Oriented Behavior Tests 
 
This set of tests assess the validity of the structure indirectly by applying certain behavior test 
on model-generated behavior patterns (Barlas 1989, Forrester & Senge, 1980). These tests 
involve simulation and are considered strong behavior tests that can help the modeler to 
uncover potential structural flaws. 
Extreme-Condition Test 
 
This test implicates assigning extreme values to certain parameters and comparing the model-
generated behavior of the observed or anticipated behavior of the real system under the same 
condition. 
A good example for the extreme-condition test is the Defenders and Attackers Capabilities. 
These parameters are exogenous in the model and play an important role in determining the 
security level of each vector of access to the information asset that the firm is trying to protect.  
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For instance, higher capabilities for either of the two adversaries will mean and increase or a 
decrease in the security level of each vector, which therefore will be translated into more or 
less-successful attacks triggering investment strategies for future periods. 
An extreme-condition test involving Defenders Capabilities can help test whether the descried 
mechanism follows a robust formulation. This is particularly important since if firms dedicate 
a higher budget to security measures, it would mean more protection and fewer successful 
breaches into the firm’s asset. However, a sudden change in this parameter is not realistic 
because companies often have a relatively fixed budget for security actions. On the other hand, 
Attackers Capabilities might experience a drastic drop or boost in life, however, cyber 
criminals are IT professionals that are methodic in their operations. This means that they have 
certain level of capabilities they can plan on to run their business model. 
Figure 22, shows the model’s response to extreme-conditions for Defenders Capabilities. As 
the figure shows, the Defenders capabilities where changed to 10,000 Euros, meanwhile the 
Attackers Capabilities remained the same. Since the defenders can protect more their asset in 
all their vectors, their financial performance increase since they maintain their reputation high 
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 Figure 22 Extreme-condition test 1: Defenders Capabilities 
Figure 23 Extreme-condition test 1: Defenders Capabilities 
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Figure 24 and 25, shows the model’s response to extreme-conditions for Attackers Capabilities. 
As the figure illustrates, the attacker’s capabilities where changed to 1,000 Attacks, meanwhile 
the defenders’ capabilities remained the same. Since the defenders cannot protect their asset in 
neither of their vectors, their financial performance drops drastically as their reputation is very 

















Behavior Sensitivity Test 
 
Behavior sensitivity test consists of determining those parameters to which the model is highly 
sensitive and asking if the real system would exhibit similar high sensitivity to the 
corresponding parameters. The following simulations represent the sensitivity analysis 
performed first, in the model’s initial conditions for the accumulated successful attacks of the 
attackers for vectors A, B and C. Then, sensitivity analysis was conducted with changes in 
unitary cost of attack (damage). 
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 Figure 24 Extreme-condition test 2: Attackers Capabilities 
Figure 25 Extreme-condition test 2: Attackers Capabilities 
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Initial conditions of the stocks for Attackers 
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Figure 27 Sensitivity test 2 
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Figure 29 Sensitivity test 4 
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Figure 30 Sensitivity test 5 
The results of the sensitivity test showed that the model is highly sensitive initial conditions 
for the accumulated successful attacks of the attackers for vectors A, B and C; and unitary cost 
of attack (damage). The results are consistent with the behavior of the real system according to 
the existing knowledge available in the literature. 
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Integration method and DT Error Tests 
 
System Dynamics models are usually formulated in continuous time and solved by numerical 
integration. The integration method selected to construct this model was 4th order, Runge-Kutta 
(fixed step) with time step equal to 0.25, meaning that since the simulation is run in months, 
the time step will display attacks happening weekly. These choices were made this way in order 
to yield an approximation of the underlying continues dynamics that are accurate enough 
according to the purpose of the model.  
The integration method test consists in alternating the current integration method to another, in 
this case, the model was changed to run with 1st order, Euler (fixed step) integration method. 
As a note, this test was the first simulation test carried out to avoid failures in the model results.  
This test revealed that there are not significant differences in the behavior or the model. 
The DT error test aims to find out whether the model is sensitive to the settings of time steps. 
This test is conducted by cutting the time step in half from 0.25 to 0.125 and running the model 
again. The result of this test was that the model is not sensitive to changes in DT. 
 
6.3 Behavior Validity 
 
Behavior Pattern Tests 
 
Once enough confidence has been built in the validity of the model structure, the behavior 
pattern tests are usually conducted to measure how accurately the model can reproduce the 
major behavior patterns exhibited by the real system. Generally, this test involves comparing 
the generated behavior of the model with the reference mode (behavior of the real system). 
However, the reference model of this study does not have available data. Instead, the nature of 
the problem created the context that we are modeling based on the concepts existing in the 
literature regarding information security. 
To conclude this chapter, the validation of the model relies primarily on the structure and 
structure-oriented behavior tests. The behavior pattern testing can be conducted only based on 
the available knowledge in the information security literature. Nevertheless, this model 
demonstrated the historical reference mode of the problem undertaken in this study, which was 




Chapter 7: Scenario Analysis 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to answer the fourth research questions by testing the hypothesis 
that the Wait-and-see and Weakest Link approaches are no longer effective strategies when 
making investment decisions under uncertainty. 
7.1 Scenario Description 
The conditions for each scenario were considered based on the base run, information 
asymmetries in defender/attacker capabilities and in security vector values. These three 
conditions were selected due to: 
 First, the base scenario shows the behavior of the system when capabilities and vector 
values are equal. This allows the WL and WAS strategies to operate both with and 
without uncertainty.  
 Second, defenders and attackers’ capabilities determine how likely the attackers are to 
exploit the vectors with the WL strategy, and how likely the defenders are to react to 
breaches based on the WAS strategy. If the attacker has higher resources than the 
defender, he will be able to breach the defenses in vectors. On the other hand, higher 
defenders’ capabilities mean that the defenders will be able to block all incoming 
attacks, which means no reaction to breaches (since they never come to be) and thus, 
no use of the WAS strategy. 
 Finally, asymmetries in vector value yield more realism to the analysis, since in reality, 
security vectors have different weight in values. Therefore, when breaches happen in a 
valuable vector, this can cause a greater or lower damage in performance of the 
defender depending on such vector’s value. 
The scenario space is a matrix of outcomes for alternative conditions against anticipated 
scenarios, such matrix constructed for this section consists of a 3 by 4 matrix composed by: 
base scenario conditions, asymmetric capabilities and asymmetric vector values against a base 
scenario with uncertainty equal to zero and three levels of uncertainty classified in low, medium 





Scenarios illustrate what is the effect of a change in capabilities from both parties and in the 
weight of value that each security vector, in financial performance of defenders and attackers 
and in successful attacks under different levels of uncertainty. Figure, shows the portion of the 








When activated, uncertainty is a multiplier of the attack unitary cost that determines each 
security vector’s vulnerability, as shown in Figure. A continuous uniform distribution8,also 
known as rectangular distribution was chosen to perform the scenario space analysis.  
Given that this study is a theoretical framework of the cybersecurity field, the scenarios were 
analyzed given a constant probability of having higher or lower damages of cyber-attacks by 
assuming a minimum and maximum value in each uncertainty level. A uniform distribution is 
given by the formula: 
                                    f(x) = (Max - Min)-1, when Min < x < Max 
Disproportional ranges of uncertainty were selected as Low= U(0.95, 1.1), Medium= U(0.875, 
1.25) and High= U(0.75, 1.5); to allow more dynamic investment strategies between defenders 
and attackers. If we assume a balance distribution around 1, the defender will likely shut down 
all the successful attack opportunities for the attacker. To avoid this, we restrict the lower 
boundary of the uniform distribution that benefits the defender hinders the attackers such that 
the distance from the lower boundary to 1 is half of the distance between 1 and the upper 
boundary. Each range of uncertainty is calculated with a RANDOM function which generates 
a series of random numbers that are distributed according to the uniform distribution.  
                                                          
8 In a uniform distribution, all intervals of the same length on the distribution's support are equally probable. The 
support is defined by the two parameters, a and b, which are its minimum and maximum values (Cassela & Berger, 























  Figure 32 Scenario Analysis: Uncertainty levels Figure 31 Scenario Analysis: Uncertainty 
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Scenarios with uncertainty were simulated with the risk analysis component in Powersim 
Studio Software version 9. The sampling technique used for sensitivity simulations was Latin 
Hypercube Sampling technique9, running the model 100 times to obtain an average simulation 
in the final run, since a uniform distribution is being used. 
 
The scenario space analysis is presented with an outline of scenarios followed by three parts:  
 The first diagram, Scenario Model Behavior: Changing the parameters, shows how the 
parameters were changed to operationalize the scenarios of each cell.  
 The second diagram, Scenario Model Behavior: Defender/Attacker Performance, 
shows how one key indicator changes with respect to each change in the level of 
uncertainty affecting the financial performance of the adversaries.  
 The final chart Scenario Model Behavior: Successful Attacks, illustrates how changes 
in key indicators influence the successful attacks on each security vector. 
                                                          
9 The Latin Hypercube Sampling (LHS) technique is the recommended sampling method. Formal comparisons 
have revealed that LHS is a highly efficient way to test a model (Ford, 2010) It combines the advantages of simple 
random sampling (as used in the Monte Carlo technique), and full factorial designs. This means that all areas of 
the sample space are represented. The probability distribution of each assumption is segmented into several non-
overlapping intervals with equal probability (McKay et al., 1979). 
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Defense Capabilities 
 Attack Unitary Cost= 10 * 
U (0.95,1.1) 
 Equal Vector Values 
(A, B and C = 1) 
 Defense Capabilities> 
Attackers Capabilities 
 Attackers Capabilities> 
Defense Capabilities 
 Attack Unitary Cost= 10* U 
(0.875,1.25) 
 Equal Vector Values 
(A, B and C = 1) 
 Defense Capabilities> 
Attackers Capabilities 
 Attackers Capabilities> 
Defense Capabilities 
 Attack Unitary Cost= 10* U 
(0.75,1.5) 
 Equal Vector Values 




 Uncertainty = 1 
 Defense Capabilities= 
Attackers Capabilities 
 Attack Unitary Cost= 10 
 Vector Values: 
Max = 1.25 
Medium = 1 
   Min = 0.75 
 Defense Capabilities= 
Attackers Capabilities 
 Attack Unitary Cost= 10 * 
U (0.95,1.1) 
 Vector Values: 
Max = 1.25 
Medium = 1 
Min = 0.75 
 
 Defense Capabilities= 
Attackers Capabilities 
 Attack Unitary Cost= 10* U 
(0.875,1.25) 
 Vector Values: 
Max = 1.25 
Medium = 1 
Min = 0.75 
 
 Defense Capabilities= 
Attackers Capabilities 
 Attack Unitary Cost= 10* U 
(0.75,1.5) 
 Vector Values: 
Max = 1.25 
Medium = 1 
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Scenario #2 
Capabilities 
Defense = 3000 
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Attacker = 300 
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7.2 Description of Results of Scenario Analysis 
 
7.2.1 Scenario #1: Base Scenario 
 
The base scenario describes the initial conditions already mentioned in the base run in Chapter. 
As the weakest link approach is operating in all scenarios, attackers have historical successful 
attacks (A=10, B=7 and C=5). Therefore, attackers are addressing all subsequent attack efforts 
in correspondence to these initial conditions. The following are the assumptions applied in the 
Base Scenario: 
o Defenders and Attackers capabilities are the equal. 
o Security Vector Values are the same. Vectors A, B and C are equal to 1. 
No Uncertainty 
Uncertainty is a multiplier of the unitary cost; this means that there is no uncertainty in the base 
scenario since uncertainty is equal to 1. Both attackers and defenders know what is the damage 
(attack unitary cost = 10) that an attack will cause to the information asset through the vector 










As shown in the base scenario of the first diagram, attacks are successful starting with A as the 
start period indicates. However, attackers are switching to the next weakest link whenever the 
defender fixes the security flaws where the most successful attacks are being reported. 
Low Uncertainty 
In this case, the Attack Unitary Cost is multiplied by uncertainty U (0.95,1.1). The financial 
performance of defenders is still growing, although with mild ups and downs. On the other 
hand, attackers’ performance is also unsteadily growing but still performing below defenders’ 
performance, as exhibited in the base scenario. 

































Successful attacks are taking place because of the attacker’s weakest link strategy, showing an 
increase in attacks for vectors B and A at the end of the period peaking to almost 100 attacks. 
Medium Uncertainty 
In this case, the Attack Unitary Cost is multiplied by uncertainty U(0.875,1.25). The financial 













Successful attacks continue hitting more intensely the defenses. This time, vector A, B and C 
are increasing in magnitude, whenever the attacker switches to the next weakest link. 
High Uncertainty 
In this case, the Attack Unitary Cost is multiplied by uncertainty U(0.75,1.5). Defender’s 
financial performance continues dropping below zero, experiencing even more financial losses. 
On the contrary, attackers are still performing positively and increasingly. 
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Under high uncertainty, all vectors are experiencing successful attacks in a variable way and 
in high intensity. The previous behavior makes the defender helpless in the way that they cannot 
distribute their resources effectively since the successful attacks are constantly shifting, making 
it difficult to just follow the wait-and-see strategy.  
 
7.2.2 Scenario # 2: Asymmetric Capabilities 
 
The purpose of this scenario is to show the model’s behavior when one of the adversaries have 
more resources than the other and what is the effect of that behavior in the successful attacks 
and financial performance of both parties. The following are assumptions treated in the 
Asymmetric Capabilities scenario: 
o Defenders Capabilities are tripled to 3000 Euros. 
o Attackers Capabilities are tripled to 300 Attacks. 
o Security Vector Values are the same. Vectors A, B and C are equal to 1. 
No Uncertainty 
When capabilities of defenders are tripled and the attacker’s stays the same, the financial 
performance of the defender is positively increasing, considerably. Meanwhile, when 
attackers’ capabilities are greater than defenders’ capabilities, the latter is affected negatively 
and attackers are benefited. 
In the case of successful attacks, if defenders’ capabilities surpass the attackers, then there are 
no successful attacks. By contrast, when attackers’ capabilities are higher than defenders, then 
they will exploit all vectors constantly in the proportion they started attacking since the 
defender is unable to catch up with attacks. This develops in the same manner even when 
uncertainty is in place, in all its levels. 







































In this case, the Attack Unitary Cost is multiplied by uncertainty U (0.95,1.1). Defender’s 
financial performance is decreasing negatively. Simultaneously, attackers continue to perform 
well. 
Medium Uncertainty 
Here, the Attack Unitary Cost is multiplied by uncertainty U (0.875,1.25). Defender’s financial 
performance continues decreasing negatively and attackers stay being profited. 
High Uncertainty 
At this point, the Attack Unitary Cost is multiplied by uncertainty U (0.75,1.5). Defender’s 
financial performance drops to even higher negative values. Concurrently, attackers are still 
being favored since they are superior in capabilities. 
If the asymmetries in capabilities between defenders and attackers are substantial, as shown in 
the graphs, then an increased uncertainty does not make a significant impact on defenders and 
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7.2.3 Scenario # 3: Asymmetric Vector Values 
 
The focus of this scenario is to visualize the impact that different weights in vector values 
would affect the financial performance of both parties, as well as in the successful attacks. This 
leads to the question of “What if an attack in certain security vector (which is more valuable) 
causes more harm than the others to the defender in terms of reputation?”. The following are 
the assumptions applied in the Asymmetric Vector Values scenario: 
o Defenders Capabilities and Attackers Capabilities are equal. 










As shown in the graphs, the fact that the defender has asymmetric vector values, does not affect 
the financial performance of defenders over time. Defender’s performance change according 
to the values assigned to each vector based on the successful attacks breaching them, however, 
their performance increases and is higher than attackers’ performance. Attackers are steadily 
performing well since they are still being successful on the attacks they are launching. 
Similarly, asymmetric vector values do not have any incidence in the successful attacks, since 
the attackers operate with the weakest link strategy and they switch from vector to vector 
whenever is profitable to do so. This makes sense given that the profit perceived by the attacker 
for one successful attack in each vector, is the same regardless of the value such vector has for 
the defender. 
Low Uncertainty 
At this point, the Attack Unitary Cost is multiplied by uncertainty U (0.95,1.1). Defenders’ 
performance change according the values assigned to each vector which are the result of the 
breaches from the weakest link strategy that the attacker is using.  
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Although, defenders are harmed under low uncertainty, they have the possibility to recover 
from such harm in most of the cases. The graphs show that when the attackers prefer the most 
valuable vector for the defender, the initial damage to the defender is substantial. However, the 
defender has enough time to recover from such damage. When attackers have a second-class 
preference for the most valuable vector for defenders, a noticeable damage is made in the 
intermediate zone of the simulation, which does not give enough time to the defender to 
recover. 
Low uncertainty is enough to cause changes in successful attacks quantities which account for 
negative trends in financial performance of the defender. 
Medium Uncertainty 
In this case, the Attack Unitary Cost is multiplied by uncertainty U(0.875,1.25). Financial 
performance for defenders is dropping below zero, as uncertainty is higher, regardless of the 
value of the vectors.  
Under medium uncertainty, the number of successful attacks are present an important increase 
from low to medium uncertainty. This increase, can explain the aforementioned negative 
performance of defenders. 
High Uncertainty 
In this case, the Attack Unitary Cost is multiplied by uncertainty U(0.75,1.5). Defenders’ 
financial performance display pronounced decline across the changes in vector values. 
Successful attacks from medium to high uncertainty, the maximum number of attacks in a given 
vector does not increase much. However, the number of vectors in which the maximum number 
of attacks are reported, is higher. 
Having asymmetries in vector values does not favor the defender in preventing the attackers 
from eroding defender’s reputation. Furthermore, high uncertainty benefits the attackers in 







7.3 Discussion of Implications of Scenario Analysis 
 
As the weakest link strategy is operating in all scenarios, the attacker will prefer the vector with 
the lowest protection and exploit it until he cannot get more benefits. Meanwhile, the defender 
is applying the wait-and-see strategy to fix the vulnerabilities according the historical 
successful attacks. This is effective when there is no uncertainty introduced in the model. 
As uncertainty is introduced and/or increased, the benefits to take a wait-and-see approach 
decreases. Thus, with high uncertainty, the defender is practically acting blindly since the 
breaches are highly unstable, encouraging the defender to defer investments (or underinvest) 
and “surrender” preferring to cope with some attacks. This difficulty in decision-making is 
translated negatively into reputation, hence in financial performance of the defender. The 
higher the uncertainty, attacks become less intensive in one vector with respect to the others, 
this means that the defender de-invest in the other vectors.  
On the other hand, attackers might change attack strategies. That is, they might not choose to 
extensively exploit the weakest link to confuse the defender and trigger misallocations of 
security investments. In fact, there is anecdotal evidence of some spammers, who send waves 
of messages with no other apparent purpose than to wear out self-learning spam filters (Bohme 














Chapter 8. Policy Options Analysis 
 
This chapter aims to answer the fourth research question. In this chapter, policy options 
regarded as corporate security management strategies are proposed. Section 8.1 shows 
Information Sharing as one of the proposed policy options, this policy option aims at reducing 
uncertainty regarding attacks and increasing the defender’s performance; and section 8.2 
depicts Higher Dismissal Time of Attacks as the second policy option, which aims at improving 
defenders’ knowledge about attacks and increasing their financial performance as well. 
Assessments and comments on the implications these policy options are pointed out in the 
concluding section of the chapter. 
8.1 Policy Option 1: Information Sharing  
 
As one of the economic barriers of improving information security is the lack of available data, 
the argument for sharing information is based on the belief that firms can reduce uncertainty 
regarding cybersecurity threats, vulnerabilities and, in turn, security breaches; based on the 
experiences of other (especially similar) firms (Gordon et al., 2015). In the following figure, 
the information sharing policy option was introduced to the uncertainty section of the model 
based on the previous scenario analysis construction. 
 
Figure 33 Information Sharing Policy Option 
The goal of this piece of structure in the model, is to reduce uncertainty across the simulation 
period, experiencing a delay of the half of the total simulation time from the moment that the 
policy is put in place until the perceived benefits are effective.  
Figure 34, illustrates how the different levels of uncertainty are working in the model based on 


















The policy option analysis with Information Sharing is presented with an outline of scenarios 
followed by two parts:  
 The first diagram, shows how this policy option with respect to each change in the level 
of uncertainty affecting the financial performance of the adversaries.  
 The second diagram, illustrates how this policy option influence the successful attacks 


























































 Figure 34 Uncertainty levels with Information Sharing 
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8.1.1 Information Sharing Model Behavior: Defender/Attacker Performance 
 











































































































8.1.2 Information Sharing Model Behavior: Successful Attacks 
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8.1.3 Description of Results for Policy Option 1: Information Sharing 
 
The policy options analysis is simulated with the base run initial conditions and compared with 
the simulations generated by adding the Information Sharing policy option into the model.  
No Uncertainty 
It is clearly seen in the graph that the fact that information sharing policy option is in place, 
does not affect the financial performance of defenders neither attackers. Similarly, successful 
attacks do not show any change with this policy. Therefore, the behavior of the system is the 
same as in the base scenario. 












Introducing low uncertainty in the model, it is revealed that with information sharing is 
reducing uncertainty already and visibly improving the defender’s financial performance. 
Meanwhile attackers’ performance remains the same. 
Successful attacks are also reduced in magnitude reaching less than 100 attacks across the 
simulations. 
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As uncertainty is increasing, it can be observed that financial performance of defenders 
improving after the first 20 months, surpassing greatly the attackers at the end of the simulation. 
Defenders are experiencing successful attacks; however, they are able to recover from them. 
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With high uncertainty, the defenders’ financial performance decreases in the beginning of the 
simulation until time 40, where it starts increasing increasingly. After time 80, defenders are 
able to recover and exceed attackers. The Information Sharing effect is also visualized in the 
successful attacks, attack shifting across the vectors is reduced, allowing defenders to fix the 
security vulnerabilities and receiving benefits. However, in order for defenders to perceive 
these benefits they have to wait until this policy option acts in reducing uncertainty. 
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8.2 Policy Option 2: Higher Dismissal Time of Attacks 
 
Defenders make investment decisions based on their reported successful attacks. This infers 
that attacks must be dismissed after some time either because they were resolved or they are 
simply discarded since they are not relevant. In the base run simulation, the dismissal time of 
attacks for the defender is one month. Figure 35 shows the dismissal time in the model. 
The main purpose of this policy option is to increase the dismissal time of attacks, so the 
defender “keeps” the reports of successful attacks for longer time in order to learn more from 
them and eventually reduce uncertainty surrounding future attacks. 
 
Figure 35 Dismissal Time Policy Option 
Before analyzing this policy option, a sensitivity policy parameter test to find the specific time 
where the uncertainty in the system is reduced and the behavior of the system, improved. The 
first policy parameter change was to introduce 3 months as dismissal time instead of 1 month. 
The result of this test showed no improvement in the system’s behavior (reducing uncertainty). 
The second policy parameter test was introducing 4 moths as dismissal time. A tipping point 
for policy efforts was found in this stage. The system improved defenders’ financial 
performance and successful attacks by reducing uncertainty. 
The policy options analysis with higher dismissal time is presented with an outline of scenarios 
followed by two parts: The first diagram, shows how this policy option with respect to each 
change in the level of uncertainty affecting the financial performance of the adversaries.    The 


















































8.2.1 Higher Dismissal Time Model Behavior: Defender/Attacker Performance 
Dismissal time = 3 months 








































































































8.2.2 Higher Dismissal Time Model Behavior: Successful Attacks 
Dismissal time = 3 months 
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8.2.3 Higher Dismissal Time Model Behavior: Defender/Attacker Performance 
Dismissal time = 4 months 



































































































8.2.4 Higher Dismissal Time Model Behavior: Successful Attacks 
Dismissal time = 4 months 
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8.2.5 Description of Results for Policy Option: Higher Dismissal Time (4 months) 
 
The policy options analysis is simulated with the base run initial conditions and compared with 
the simulations generated by adding the Higher Dismissal Time policy option into the model.  
No Uncertainty 
It is visible in the graph that when this policy option is in place, the financial performance of 
defenders increases meaningfully. On the other hand, attackers’ performance remain the same 
as in the base scenario and considerably below the defenders performance. 











Similarly, successful attacks show a drastic change with this policy. The weakest link operates 
in the beginning of the simulation with successful attacks in Vector A as it is stated in the initial 
conditions. However, in the following periods, defenders are effectively maintaining the 
vector’s security, not allowing security breaches in any of the three vectors only until the end 
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Low, Medium and High Uncertainty 
Introducing uncertainty in the model, it is revealed that with higher dismissal time, the 
defenders’ good financial performance remains increasing in a positive way. Meanwhile 
attackers’ performance remains the same and dramatically lower than defenders. The following 
table shows the behavior of the system with this policy option under high uncertainty. 
 











Successful attacks are also reduced in magnitude reaching important levels only in vector A in 
the beginning (since it is the weakest link) and at the end of the simulation in vector C and A 
but in lower magnitude. Defenders were able to tackle security breaches in most of the duration 
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8.3 Combination of Information Sharing and Higher Dismissal time  
 
The next diagrams, present a combination of the two policy options previously exposed. The 
first diagram shows the financial performance of both Defenders and Attackers and the second 
diagram shows the behavior of successful attacks. 
8.3.1 Combination Model Behavior: Defender/Attacker Performance 
 
 Without Information Sharing nor 
Higher Dismissal Time 
With Information Sharing and 

































































































8.3.2 Combination Model Behavior: Defender/Attacker Performance 
 
 Without Information Sharing nor 
Higher Dismissal Time 
With Information Sharing and 
Higher Dismissal Time 
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8.3.3 Description of Results for Combination of Information Sharing and Higher 
Dismissal Time 
 
By combining the two policy options, it can be observed in the previous diagrams, that there is 
an overall improvement on the defense’s behalf. Defenders’ financial performance is 
significantly superior to attackers and increasing and successful attacks are mostly mitigated 
by the defender throughout the periods, especially under high uncertainty. 
 
8.4 Discussion of Implications of Policy Options Analysis 
 
8.4.1 Policy Option 1: Information Sharing 
 
Information sharing has the potential for reducing uncertainty surrounding information security 
investment decisions. As a result of this reduction in uncertainty, information sharing is likely 
to lessen the common tendency by firms to wait for a major breach in information security 
before investing significant funds for security activities. In other words, Information sharing 
encourages firms to take a more proactive, compared to a reactive approach towards 
cybersecurity investments. Thus, the value to take a wait-and-see approach decreases as the 
uncertainty associated with the investments increases. 
First, it was illustrated that under medium and high uncertainty, the defender’s financial 
performance experience a worst-before-better behavior regarding their recovering from 
security breaches. This suggests that defenders should be patient to perceive the benefits of 
information sharing, this finding makes sense since it takes time for the information collection 
and gathering to be completed. Furthermore, this information requires time to be analyzed and 
understood by the security staff and for security managers to make investment decisions. Also, 
an increase in the defense’s benefits is clearly seen in the graphs, which should encourage firms 
to share their information in return for receiving information from other firms. This can also 
offset the costs typically associated with belonging to an information-sharing group (Gal-Or & 
Ghose, 2005). 
While the analysis of this study showed that information sharing does indeed offer the potential 
to reduce overall uncertainty revolving information security, there are some pitfalls that may 
well prevent the realization of the full potential benefits. One of these pitfalls is the prevalence 
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of free-riding members in the information sharing group. Emerging free-riding10 in an 
information-sharing group is one of the major reasons why firms are reluctant to share 
cybersecurity information (Gordon et al., 2003b).   
Another obstacle for a firm to share its information regarding cyber security is taking risk to 
compromise the firm’s competitive advantage by disclosing security weaknesses. Accordingly, 
Gal-Or & Ghose (2005) and Gordon et al. (2003b) remark that although information sharing’s 
pitfalls revolve around the need to create economic incentives to facilitate effective information 
sharing (p.481) such as insurance risk premium, bug challenge and bounty, etc.  
 
8.4.2 Policy Option 2: Higher Dismissal Time 
 
Increasing the dismissal time of successful attacks has managerial implications. For example, 
by keeping the information regarding reported successful attacks for 4 months instead of 1 
month, firms may experience the need of specialized staff to analyze the collected data, incur 
in costs for data warehousing infrastructure, assign a response (IT Forensics) team with all 
competencies, and to have an integrated system to collect data. 
If there is no uncertainty, a defender can still perform well following a standard wait-and-see 
approach. As soon as uncertainty arises, the more valuable the information gained from 
observed attacks is. This means that defenders become more proactive when uncertainty is 
high.  
 
8.4.3 Combination of two policy options 
 
Individually, each policy improves the financial performance of defenders over time. However, 
information sharing reduces uncertainty but it entails a more delayed success than increasing 
the dismissal time of attacks, financial performance of defenders with information sharing 
suffer losses in the first half of the period. Apart from the late success in reducing uncertainty, 
information sharing carries several obstacles to be executed in the first place, such obstacles 
                                                          
10 The free rider problem refers to a situation where a firm can benefit from a situation irrespective of the 
magnitude of the firm’s contribution. See Varian (2002) for an analysis of how the free-rider problem affects 




include the free-rider problem, regulations and mostly lack of economic incentive to belong to 
an information sharing group since most firms are hesitant to expose their security weaknesses 
to their competitors indicating a market disadvantage even though a coordinated view of attacks 
could prompt faster mitigation to everyone’s benefit.  
Meanwhile, increasing the dismissal time of attacks on its own, present an almost immediate 
success allowing to analyze deeply the reported successful attacks for longer time. This policy 
clearly improves the financial performance for defenders and diminish successful attacks. 
However, this is the policy option that involves the more need of resources since it requires 
integrated infrastructure and specialized response staff (IT Forensics) to be able to collect 
analyze and storage information about attacks for 4 months. 
Implementation of the combination of information sharing and higher dismissal time depends 
on the size of the firms and the available budget (capabilities) to invest in information security. 
As it was observed in the combined policy simulations, there is small added value in combining 
the two policies since defenders can perceive benefits in different ways by implementing just 
one policy at the time. The dismissal time policy results seem to be just as good as the combined 
policy. In other words, the marginal benefit of information sharing is seemed to be practically 
zero if the dismissal time policy is already in place.  
Therefore, firms that are smaller may opt to be part of an information sharing group, especially 
if these are similar firms, since it required less budget to reduce uncertainty. The greater the 
similarities among the firms, the more likely the information shared will be accurate and 
valuable in terms of reducing uncertainty. On the other hand, greater firms might be motivated 
to put higher dismissal time policy in place since they are more likely to dispose a higher budget 
to implement this policy. Plus, big firms can avoid the pitfalls of belonging to an information 









Chapter 9: Conclusions 
This study presented a System Dynamics model with endogenous investment decisions 
between two adversaries in the information security field. The model was built to better 
understand the dynamic investment decision strategies evoked by defenders and attackers. 
Scenarios and policies were tested to explore the implications of investment strategies under 
uncertainty. The conclusions of this work comprise the answer of the research questions and 
limitations which are shown thereafter. 
9.1 Answer to Research Questions 
 
Chapter 1 depicted an introduction to the current problematic situation of information security, 
motivated its importance and served as means to focus on one of its major pressing issues, 
security investments. This chapter also introduced the research objective and research 
questions that would be addressed by this thesis. To summarize, the objective of this thesis 
project is to first, understand the dynamic interactions between defenders and attackers when 
making information security investment decisions, and second, derive the main implications of 
two theoretical frameworks from information security investment literature: The Wait-And-
See approach for defenders and the Weakest Link approach for attackers. A System Dynamics 
model to study investment strategies derived from such theories was built. The model is also 
utilized to identify and assess possible policy leverage points to mitigate the effects inherent in 
such analysis. 
Chapter 2 described the chosen methodology to develop the objective of this thesis. It was 
explained why System Dynamics is an appropriate methodology to represent the dynamic 
mechanisms of information security investments. In addition, the data collection and analysis 
process was described in detail.  
Chapter 3 provided an overview of the existing literature which the answer to the first research 
question (What are the relevant concepts and variables and relationships described in Wait-
And-See and Weakest Link theoretical frameworks?). This chapter provided a detailed 
explanation of the previous research carried out by scholars and experts in the information 
security investments field. It was through the systematic literature review that the factors 
driving information security investment and how these factors in turn depend on the outcomes 




Chapter 4 focused on representing the dynamic interactions between attackers and defenders 
in a System Dynamics model. This Chapter answered the second research question (How can 
existing theories defined in WAS and WL be represented in a System Dynamics framework?) 
To answer this research question, the WAS and WL theoretical frameworks were integrated in 
a causal loop diagram (CLD). The CLD described two main feedback loops: a reinforcing loop 
operating in the Weakest Link strategy where an increase in successful attacks leads to more 
attacks from the attacker, therefore, an increase in vulnerability in security vectors; and a 
balancing loop operating with the Wait-and-see strategy where an increase in successful 
attacks, yields more investments from the defense so there is a reduction in vulnerability of 
security vectors. As the two investment strategies were integrated into a system dynamics 
simulation model, chapter 4 also explained in detail how these mechanisms interact with each 
other, as well as explicitly stated the assumptions supporting the model. 
Chapter 5 described the behavior of the system by means of the analysis of the base run and 
equilibrium run, answering the third research question (What are the dynamic implications of 
WAS and WL theories in the SD model?). The system behavior in the base run showed the 
weakest link and wait-and-see strategies operating. It was observed that attackers are constantly 
finding the weakest link and exploiting it, meanwhile the defenders are fixing the defense flaws 
as the attacks happen. The financial performance of both defenders and attackers is visualized 
while each party is applying their investment strategy.  
Chapter 6 established the model’s validity and provided strengthened confidence both in its 
qualitative and quantitative results. This strengthened confidence was supported by the 
coherent and consistent way the key variables of the model such as initial conditions of 
accumulated successful and defender/attacker capabilities, were related to each other. The 
simulation of these key components resulted in adequate behavior when compared to the 
knowledge available for comparison in the real system.  
Chapter 7 answered the fourth research question (What are the dynamic implications for 
investment decisions in information security under different uncertainty level scenarios?). 
Through the delimitation of three different scenarios, conditions such as asymmetries in 
capabilities and in vector values played an important role when analyzing the behavior of 
financial performance of defenders and attackers and successful attacks under low, medium 
and high uncertainty compared with the base scenario.  
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In this regard the answer to the fourth research, can be given along the line that if uncertainty 
is high, a defender surrenders and prefers to cope with attacks. High uncertainty can demotivate 
security investments since defenders are deciding practically blind folded and attackers might 
not choose to fully exploit the weakest link to confuse the defender and trigger misallocations 
of security spending. 
After the detail scenario analysis, Chapter 8 addressed the fifth research question (What policy 
options can be identified and what are their dynamic implications?). Two policy options that 
could reduce uncertainty and improve financial performance regarding information security, 
were identified. These policies were evaluated in terms of their effects in financial performance 
of both opponents and in successful attacks. To conclude this chapter, a brief discussion of the 
possible implications of the implementation of such policies, was brought to attention.  
The policy dimension of this study is to allow ways to reduce or cope with uncertainty. This 
can be done by including information gathering with other defenders and/or increasing the 
dismissal time of successful attacks. The demonstrated benefit gained from information sharing 
could provide the necessary incentive to overcome firms’ reluctance to actively share their 
private information. However, defenders experience a worst-before better behavior in their 
financial performance, suggesting that they should be patient when implementing this policy 
options since the benefits will be perceived after some time. The second policy option, seems 
to be more promising in terms of immediacy of results, though there are managerial 
implications that need careful consideration when selecting this policy option. A combination 
of policies is possible as shown in the analysis, giving advantageous results for defenders. 
There are key characteristics to consider in this regard: the average size of firms and the budget 
available to invest in information security. 
All in all, the model developed in this study helped identify influential factors, notably 
uncertainty about attacks, so that incentive-based security countermeasures can be derived. The 
presentation of the model behavior in a scenario and policy space, provides support to employ 







9.2 Limitations and Further Work 
 
As with most research related to information security, the research contained in this thesis has 
its limitations. 
 A natural extension of the research would be to empirically test the conceptual arguments 
presented in this thesis. One way to conduct such a test would be via a laboratory 
experiment, where the participants play as corporate managers in charge of cybersecurity 
activities within their firms.  
 The current research effort based the decision rules of attackers and defenders on robust 
assumptions or best available data. All data sources regarding information security 
investments were distilled from literature, scientific articles, reports, among others. By 
conducting case studies of cybersecurity investment decisions by actual firms using their 
records and mental models, would represent another way to empirically test the arguments 
of this thesis and would prove valuable in terms of validating the resulting model. 
 Since the capabilities of both adversaries were modelled as exogenous parameters, it 
would be interesting to expand the boundaries of the model to include the dynamics of the 
financial mechanism undergoing in the defenders and attackers, endogenously. This would 
prove have a great value in identifying other feedback loops concerning capabilities and 
corresponding policy options to improve the defender’s performance. 
 Another limitation of this study is that the model is lacking of financial indicators and 
analyses such as: cost-benefit analysis, Annual Loss Expectation (ALE), Return on 
Security Investment (ROSI), Net Present Value (NPV), etc.; to complement the existing 
assumptions and make the model more comprehensive, further research would be needed 
to accomplish this. 
 The current level of aggregation of the simulation model is adequate for pinpointing 
fundamental leverage points at a conceptual level; though it does not allow for precise 
estimates that could lead to the design of policies that could be put into action. 
Disaggregating and detailing the model to test the policies would be necessary step to 
following in this regard. 
The above limitations notwithstanding, this research provides an important step in helping 
firms better understand the dynamic interactions of defenders and attackers when making 
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'Reported Successful Attacks Vector A'/('Reported Successful Attacks 
Vector A'+'Reported Successful Attacks Vector B'+'Reported 





'Reported Successful Attacks Vector B'/('Reported Successful Attacks 
Vector A'+'Reported Successful Attacks Vector B'+'Reported 





'Reported Successful Attacks Vector C'/('Reported Successful Attacks 
Vector A'+'Reported Successful Attacks Vector B'+'Reported 
Successful Attacks Vector C') 
Converter 
Fraction of Attack 
Vector A 
Dimensionless 
'Switch A'*'Accumulated Successful Attacks Vector A'/('Accumulated 
Successful Attacks Vector A'+'Switch B'*'Accumulated Successful 
Attacks Vector B'+'Switch C'*'Accumulated Successful Attacks 
Vector C') 
Converter 
Fraction of Attack 
Vector B 
Dimensionless 
'Switch B'*'Accumulated Successful Attacks Vector B'/('Switch 
A'*'Accumulated Successful Attacks Vector A'+'Accumulated 
Successful Attacks Vector B'+'Switch C'*'Accumulated Successful 
Attacks Vector C') 
Converter 
Fraction of Attack 
Vector C 
Dimensionless 
'Switch C'*'Accumulated Successful Attacks Vector C'/('Switch 
A'*'Accumulated Successful Attacks Vector A'+'Switch 
B'*'Accumulated Successful Attacks Vector B'+'Accumulated 
Successful Attacks Vector C') 














Euros/Month 'Defenders Financial Performance' 
Converter Indicated Reputation Reppoints 
'Base reputation'-('Vector A Value'*'Vulnerability Vector A')-('Vector 
B Value'*'Vulnerability Vector B')-('Vector C Value'*'Vulnerability 
Vector C') 
Constant Information  Sharing Dimensionless 0 










Converter Past value A Attacks 
DELAYPPL('Accumulated Successful Attacks Vector 
A',1,0<<Attacks>>) 
Converter Past value B Attacks 
DELAYPPL('Accumulated Successful Attacks Vector 
B',1,0<<Attacks>>) 
Converter Past value C Attacks 














A.Reports        Vector 
A.in 
  'Reports        Vector A' 
Stock 
Reported Successful 










B.Reports        Vector 
B.in 
  'Reports        Vector B' 
Stock 
Reported Successful 










C.Reports         Vector 
C.in 
  'Reports         Vector C' 
Flow Reports         Vector C Attacks/Month 'Successful Attacks Vector C'/'Time to report attack' 
Flow Reports        Vector A Attacks/Month 'Successful Attacks Vector A'/'Time to report attack' 
Flow Reports        Vector B Attacks/Month 'Successful Attacks Vector B'/'Time to report attack' 






  'Building Up' 
Flow Reputation.Erosion.out   Erosion 
Converter 







IF('Vulnerability Vector A'>0<<Euros>>,(('Attackers 
Capabilities'*'Fraction of Attack Vector A')-(('Defenders 






IF('Vulnerability Vector B'>0<<Euros>>,(('Attackers 
Capabilities'*'Fraction of Attack Vector B')-(('Defenders 






IF('Vulnerability Vector C'>0<<Euros>>,(('Attackers 
Capabilities'*'Fraction of Attack Vector C')-(('Defenders 
Capabilities'*'Fraction Investment Vector C')/'Attack Unitary 
Cost')),0<<Attacks>>) 
Converter Switch A Dimensionless 
IF('Accumulated Successful Attacks Vector A'-'Past value 
A'<1<<Attacks>>,0,1) 
Converter Switch B Dimensionless 
IF('Accumulated Successful Attacks Vector B'-'Past value 
B'<1<<Attacks>>,0,1) 
Converter Switch C Dimensionless 
IF('Accumulated Successful Attacks Vector C'-'Past value 
C'<1<<Attacks>>,0,1) 
Constant Time reputation loss Month 1 
Constant 
Time to build up 
reputation 
Month 6 
Constant Time to report attack Month 1 
Converter Uncertainty Dimensionless 
IF('Activate Uncertainty'=0,1,IF('Activate Uncertainty'=2,'Medium 
UNC',IF('Activate Uncertainty'=1,'Low UNC','High UNC'))) 
Converter Vector A Value Reppoints/Euros 1 
Converter Vector B Value Reppoints/Euros 1 
Converter Vector C Value Reppoints/Euros 1 
Converter Vulnerability Vector A Euros 
('Attackers Capabilities'*'Fraction of Attack Vector A'*'Attack Unitary 
Cost'*Uncertainty)-('Defenders Capabilities'*'Fraction Investment 
Vector A') 
Converter Vulnerability Vector B Euros 
('Attackers Capabilities'*'Fraction of Attack Vector B'*'Attack Unitary 
Cost'*Uncertainty)-('Defenders Capabilities'*'Fraction Investment 
Vector B') 
Converter Vulnerability Vector C Euros 
('Attackers Capabilities'*'Fraction of Attack Vector C'*'Attack Unitary 
Cost'*Uncertainty)-('Defenders Capabilities'*'Fraction Investment 
Vector C') 
 
  
